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Introduction
Precious Commodities
Since the fragmentation of the Soviet Union in 1991, there has been heightened 
international interest in the Caspian Sea basin. This interest has generally 
focused on two commodities contained within the Caspian Sea and its 
surrounding basin: caviar and hydrocarbon reserves. The interest in caviar has 
focused on the ever decreasing amount of roe that is being gleaned from the pre­
historic sturgeon, whereas the interest in the hydrocarbon reserves has revolved 
around the seemingly vast amounts contained within the region just waiting to be 
exploited and exported. The Caspian has long been tied to the importance of 
these two indigenous commercially important commodities.
During the Soviet period, fishing limits for sturgeon, from whence caviar 
originates, were strictly enforced, and with good reason: the Caspian supplied 
then, as it does now, up to 90 percent of the world demand for caviar1 2. To place 
the significance of this into perspective, there are 25 different species of sturgeon 
with only three; Russian (Acipenser gueldenstaedtii), Stellate (Acipenser 
stellatus), and the famed Beluga {Huso huso); indigenous to the Caspian Sea, and 
it is only these three that produce genuine Caspian caviar . In the 1980s, 
according to the Caspian Fishery Research Institute in Astrakhan, the Soviet 
Union recorded sturgeon catches of up to 26,000 tons, but this figure for all of 
the Caspian nations is now closer to 3,000 tons3. A female Beluga (the largest of 
the three), can weigh as much as 800 kilograms, reach almost 10 metres in length 
and live up to 100 years4. A mature sturgeon will provide up to 90 kilograms of 
roe, which when mixed correctly with salt, transforms into caviar. This precious
1 Caspian Region Promise and Peril (MAP) (National Geographic Society: Washington, 1999).
2 There is a fourth; Sterlet, but this is considered all but extinct. The Don-Volga canal has led to 
a degree of hybridisation between Black Sea and Caspian Sea sturgeon. “General Information 
Caspian Sea”, Caspian Environment Programme at www.caspianenvironment.org.htm 
[09/01/2001].
2 Robert Cullen, “The Caspian Sea” National Geographic, Volume 195, Number 5 (May, 1998). 
p. 31.
4 “The Beluga Sturgeon: Caviar in Danger”, Ted Case Studies, at
www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/STURGEON.HTM [04/08/2000].
1
commodity of small, and ideally, black eggs and salt can sell for as much as 
$2000 per kilogram. Consequently, each individual Beluga can be worth 
upwards of $200,000. An important constraint in sturgeon farming is that their 
‘relatively late sexual maturity makes them particularly vulnerable to over- 
exploitation’5. The Beluga requires 20 years to mature before it can begin to 
produce roe. Over-exploitation, in the form of over-harvesting and 
indiscriminate poaching of the sturgeon itself6, combined with pollution of the 
Caspian Sea, has seen the official catch dwindle to a meagre fraction of what it 
was. The decline in the quantity of exportable caviar can be attributed in part to 
the demise of the USSR and to the rise in economic significance of hydrocarbon 
reserves.
However, it has been neither the endangered sturgeon nor the demand for caviar 
that has catapulted the region back into the spotlight of the world’s attention. In 
what may be seen by some to be a striking contrast to the plight of the dwindling 
number of sturgeon, which can be seen as a barometer of the growing importance 
of hydrocarbon reserves, the second commodity that has stirred both local and 
international interest, are the seemingly bountiful hydrocarbon reserves 
contained in and around the Caspian Sea basin. The region has even entered the 
realm of pop-culture with the latest James Bond movie -  The World is not 
Enough -  using the Caspian basin and its energy reserves, in particular the 
geopolitics of pipeline direction, as a basis for the film.
These amounts of hydrocarbon reserves, in particular oil, have essentially been 
promoted from a geopolitical and geostrategic position, from within the region, 
and from external actors, both political and petroleum in nature. In 1996 
Kazakstan released the findings of seismic tests that the Caspian Sea Consortium 
had conducted in the region that Kazakstan has laid claim to. According to these 
findings the offshore reserves of the Caspian Sea hold 10 Billion metric tons (70
5Sawfish and ‘caviar-fish’ pay dearly for their distinction. 
www.greenpeace.org/~comms/97/bio/cities04.html [13/05/99].
6 In 1996, a total of 623 people were arrested for poaching sturgeon in the Volga Delta where the 
Sturgeon spawns. “The Beluga Sturgeon: Caviar in Danger” ibid.
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Billion barrels)* 37. If these figures are even remotely true, this would make 
Kazakstan holder of one of the largest know oil reserves in the world. The 
United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) has, until recently, 
consistently stated that there are proven reserves of 16-32 billion barrels within 
the region, with an additional 163 billion barrels of oil, if they become proven,
o
creating a potential reserve of some 179-195 billion barrels . This figure through 
journalistic license [sic] is routinely reported as 200 billion barrels9. Given that 
the estimated proven world reserves of crude oil were 1,033 billion barrels in 
199910, a figure of 200 billion for the Caspian region would seem to justify the 
attention and intrigue afforded to it. It is because of such grand estimates that 
Rajan Menon has remarked that ‘the Caspian Sea’s energy resources are 
sometimes described with breathless wonderment’11. This ‘breathless 
wonderment’ has resulted in a race to exploit these valuable reserves.
However, the question that is raised from such assertions is an obvious one: if the 
Caspian's reserves are actually much smaller than has been widely perceived and 
promoted, then why the interest from such a variety of countries and 
multinational oil companies, and what are the implications from this ‘interest’. 
During the first part of the 20th century, the Caspian region was indeed a focus 
of world interest and highly regarded for its crude oil output, as well as being the 
birthplace of many advances in the emerging oil industry. However, with the 
emergence of the larger and more accessible oil fields in the Middle East, and the 
shift in focus away from the Caspian oil fields within the Soviet economy, the 
importance of the Caspian as a repository of hydrocarbon reserves was
7 Pauline Jones Luong, “Kazakhstan: The Long Term Costs of Short-term Gains” in “Energy
Wealth and Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus” NBR Analysis, Volume 10, Number
3, (August 1999). p. 34.
8 “Caspian Sea Region” (December 1998) United States Energy Information Administration, at 
www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Caspian.html [03/02/99],
9 cf. Bruce W. Nelan, “The Rush for Caspian Oil”, Time, (May 4 1998), pp. 36-38.
10 “Oil” BP Amoco Statistical review o f World Energy 2000 at 
www.bpamoco.com/worldenergy/oil [05/12/2000].
11 Rajan Menon, “Treacherous Terrain: The Political and Security Dimensions of Energy 
Development in the Caspian Sea Zone” NBR Analysis, Volume 9, Number 1, (February 1998). p.
7.
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significantly reduced, subsequently its importance within the Soviet economy, 
and in the eyes of the world, returned once again to caviar.
The Purpose of This Study
That the Caspian basin contains significant reserves of oil and gas is not 
disputed. What is disputed, however, is the exact amount that is actually 
contained within the various oil and gas fields and from this amount, what is 
deemed recoverable . Yet, the debate regarding the quantity of the energy 
reserves is only one aspect of the wider political intrigue. The other more 
disputed topic concerns the ultimate pipeline route, or routes, that will eventually 
enable the export of these reserves. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the 
implications and subsequent ramifications of the exploitation and extraction of 
energy reserves from the Caspian basin. It is this work’s contention that the 
ramifications are primarily of a geopolitical and geostrategic nature that have, in 
the first place, affected the littoral states of the Caspian Sea: Kazakstan, 
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran and the Russian Federation and primarily the first 
three former Soviet Republics. At a different level, exploitation and extraction 
have also influenced a number of non-littoral actors that arc also actively 
involved or seeking to be involved in the region. These non-littoral actors 
include Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
India, China (PRC), Japan, and America. In order to examine these implications 
this work will provide a general survey of hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian 
basin as well as uncovering constraints in the region’s hydrocarbon politics 
throughout both the 19th and 20th centuries. Linkages will be also established 
between hydrocarbon reserves and infrastructure on the one hand and macro­
political pressures on the other.
The littoral actors that are particularly active in seeking to exploit the Caspian 
reserves are the newly independent states of Kazakstan, Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan. Kazakstan and Azerbaijan are both blessed with significant 
quantities of oil. Kazakstan’s primary fields are Tengiz and Karachaganak,
12 A discussion on the actual size of the reserves is in Chapter 1.
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located in the west of the country, and Azerbaijan’s are concentrated in the 
offshore Azeri-Chirag-Güneshi complex. Turkmenistan is actively developing
i  ->
very large amounts of natural gas at Dauletabad-Donmez . Iran and the Russian 
Federation, which recently announced it had found oil in ‘its sector’ of the 
Caspian Sea14, also have reserves in their respective zones of the Caspian basin 
but are more interested in attempting to influence the possible direction of future 
pipeline networks. In assessing the struggle for control over this region 
Mozaffari has suggested three dimensions which need to be taken into account. 
First; who owns the oil, second who participates in its production and third what 
transportation hurdles need to be overcome for its successful selling to 
prospective buyers15.
A striking feature of the race to tap into the Caspian basin energy reserves is that 
the various multinational petroleum companies have themselves been elevated to 
a position not known in energy politics since the oil shocks of the 1970s. In the 
past, oil concessions involved significant state-to-state deliberations, whereas in 
the Caspian region the role of the competing nation-states has been relegated to 
that of spectator, as the multinational corporations (MNCs) exercise their 
independent actor role. Therefore, in discussing the Caspian, it is important to 
realise that petroleum companies are no longer just mere pawns in the foreign 
policy prescriptions of political powers. The role of these vertically integrated 
economic entities, such as Chevron (formerly SOCAL: Standard Oil of 
California)17, Royal Dutch/Shell, Unocal, newly merged BP-Amoco, and
13 Laurent Ruseckas, “State of the Field Report: Energy and Politics in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus”, Access Asia Volume 1, Number 2, (July 1998) at 
www.accessasia.org/products/aareview/VollNo2/essay2.html [21/12/98].
14 “LUKoil has Russia's first Caspian oil discovery” Press Release (3 April 2000) at 
www.findarticles.com/cf_l/m3112/14__98/61693476/print.jhtml [06/12/2000].
15 Mehdi Mozaffari, “The Oil and Gas of the Caspian Sea: Regional Cooperation and 
Competition”, in Mehdi Mozaffari (ed.). Security Politics in the Commonwealth o f Independent 
States (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). p. 199.
16 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, Dictionary o f International Relations, (London: 
Penguin Books, 1998). p. 5.
17 Chevron recently announced a 100 billion dollar merger with Texaco, which if the merger 
precedes will make it the largest oil company in the Caspian Basin, see “Chevron and Texaco 
agree to $100 billion merger creating top-tier integrated energy company”, Press Release at 
www.chevron.com/newvs/pressrel/2000/200-10-16html [ 12/2000].
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Russia’s LUKoil, in the exploration and extraction of Caspian energy reserves 
cannot be understated. Richard Matzke, chairman of Chevron Overseas 
Petroleum said, “In a reversal of history the industry today is showing its
1 ftpotential to drive geopolitical events, rather than be driven by them” .
Definitions
It is necessary to establish some boundaries and seek to provide additional 
information regarding the scope of this work considering the complexity of the 
subject and length constraints, as well as the primitive state of modem studies 
concerning the Caspian region. It is because of the ‘dearth of empirical studies’19 
and the resulting significant misunderstanding of the region that this work has 
sought to maintain a sober approach when dealing with conceptual issues. Given 
the centrality of geopolitics to this work, it is expedient to define the geography 
of the region under discussion first.
The Caspian
As a direct result of the focus on energy reserves within the Caspian Sea basin, 
the term ‘Caspian’ has emerged as a new geographical designation. The region 
is not defined on geography, per se but rather geology. Ruseckas suggests that if 
‘one’s emphasis is on the production of hydrocarbons, the Caspian region is a 
vaguely defined subset of Central Asia and the Caucasus’ . This use of 
‘Caspian’ essentially is a minimalist approach and almost exclusively refers to 
Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Turkmenistan. This ill-defined designation will not 
be followed in this work. Reference to ‘the Caspian’ unless otherwise stated, 
will refer to the Caspian Sea basin, which consists of the riparian regions of the 
five littoral states of the Caspian.
18 Stephen Kinzer, “Caspian Competitors in Race for Power on Sea of Oil” New York Times on 
the Web (24 January 1998) at www.nytimes.com [17/02/1999],
19 Hoosang Amirahmadi, “Challenges of the Caspian Region”, in Hoosang Amirahmadi (ed). 
The Caspian Region at a Crossroad, (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2000). p. 4.
20 Ruseckas, loc. cit.
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Central Asia
For the purposes of clarity ‘Central Asia’ in this paper will refer to the classical 
boundaries described in the nineteenth century , and not the current minimalist 
perception of just five former Soviet Socialist Republics. Although a widely 
used term, Central Asia, as a region, has never been clearly defined. The 
classical geographic fonnulation was made early in the nineteenth century, 
according to Lawrence Kräder, by Alexander Von Humbolt, who ‘combined 
within the area of Central Asia the entire zone from the Caspian to the Hsingan 
Range in western Manchuria, and from the Altay Mountains to the Himalayas’ .
Central Asia as a region, and the Caspian basin in general, is a complex matrix of 
inter-connected cultural, linguistic and religious peoples and any effective study 
must at least give credit to these relationships in attempting to provide an 
analysis. Accordingly, Afghanistan and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous 
province in Western China, along with Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, in this thesis, will be referred to as Central 
Asia, with the last five collectively referred as the Central Asian Republics 
(CAR). It is also important to remember, when discussing geographical 
associations, that Kazakstan, in both Russian and Soviet terminology, was not 
viewed as a part of Srednyaya Aziya (Middle [Central] Asia) . This exclusion 
was primarily made because of the sizeable ethnic Russian population, currently 
some six million, that are resident in the northern Kazakstan oblasts that border 
the Russian Federation24. As Alexandrov mentions, the earliest Russian 
settlements, in what is present day Kazakstan, began as early as 1560 . So from 
an historical Russian perspective the region ‘belonged’ to them.
21 Gerald Morgan, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia: 1810-1895, (London: Frank Cass, 
1981). p. XV.
22 Lawrence Kräder, Peoples o f Central Asia, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962). p. 1.
23 Anthony Hyman, “Central Asia and The Middle East: The Emerging Links”, in Mohiaddin 
Mesbahi (ed.) Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domestic and International 
Dynamics, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994). p. 249.
24 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs (2nd Edition), (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995). p. 
293.
2? Mikhail Alexandrov, “Russian migration to Kazakstan”, Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin, 
(June 1996) a twww.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/bulletin/buljun.htm [10/01/2000].
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The Caucasus
Similarly, by definition, Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, which is often mentioned by 
ignorant and ill-informed writers and commentators as being ‘Central Asian’ is 
excluded from this definition of Central Asia. Armenia and Georgia, along with 
Azerbaijan, are the three republics that form what are ‘the Caucasus’. It is 
erroneous to classify Azerbaijan as 'Central Asian' simply because it is: a) now 
independent, and b), the majority of its population are Muslim, whereas Georgia 
and Armenia have predominantly Orthodox Christian populations . If this 
approach is followed, then what of the Tatars and Bashkirs, and other ethnic 
groups outside of Central Asia, like Azerbaijan, and who also contain a majority 
that view themselves as Islamic ? Sweeping generalisations such as this only 
serve to obfuscate an already complex discussion.
Northern Caucasus
The region immediately to the north of the Caucasus, in the southern Russian 
Federation, is home to several autonomous oblasts (districts) and republics, 
including Chechnya, Dagestan and Kalmykia. This region is collectively 
referred to as the Northern Caucasus. It is important to stress that the Northern 
Caucasus region, which also borders the Caspian Sea, is a region of utmost 
significance for the Russian Federation in terms of pipeline routes, and has been 
the home of various irredentist movements before and after 1991.
Spelling and other conventions
Translation and transliteration always present difficulties. The substitution of 
letters in one alphabet for those in another is an exercise that is often fraught with 
danger. Central Asia and the Caucasus presents the added problem of textual 
sources that are often found in Arabic, Latin, Chinese and Cyrillic. This coupled 
with a wave of name changes in the post-Soviet space may confuse the reader 
even more. Throughout this work the following principles will be used in the 
interest of simplicity; References to proper names will follow the current library 
of Congress system, except where citing a particular source that has used a
26 These countries however represent two different traditions of Orthodox Christianity.
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different convention. For example, the spelling of Kazakstan without ‘h’ will be 
used (this is the policy promoted by the Kazak government). References to 
various govemments/agencies/administrations will be to the titular nationality. 
For example; instead of the ‘Kazakstani government’, the citation will be to the 
‘Kazak government’. In situations where names have changed, such as Frunze to 
Bishkek, the original name will appear in parenthesis immediately following the 
current name when first mentioned. Foreign words of importance will appear in 
italics, and in spelling Arabic, Persian and Turkish/Turkic words this thesis will 
follow the system used by the International Journal o f Middle East Studies. In 
selecting the use of the term ‘actor’, reference is primarily being made to nation­
states. Use of the term ‘actor’ also refers to any ‘entity that plays an identifiable 
role in international relations’ .
This sub-thesis will consist of four chapters
The first chapter: Precious Commodities - provides a conceptual foundation for 
seeking to address this topic through a geopolitical and geostrategic prism, as 
well as providing commentary on the vexed issue of the size of the Caspian 
energy reserves and the various stages of world interest in the region. The 
second chapter: Geological, Environmental and Legal Reality - What is the 
Caspian ? - will describe what the Caspian Sea physically is, and will in turn 
provide a platform for the ensuring legal discussion of whether the Caspian is a 
sea or a lake and the importance of this to the current hydrocarbon debate. As 
well as seeking to provide a geological survey of the Caspian Sea an examination 
of environmental concerns will be explored and its relationship to both 
hydrocarbon reserves and the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
The third chapter: The Central Importance of Oil, will provide an historical 
overview of energy reserves in the Caspian basin. This will enable a brief 
mention of the importance of these reserves to Tsarist Russian and the Soviet 
Union as well as providing commentary on soviet impediments to technological 
advances in exploration. The fourth chapter will identify the implications and
11 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, Dictionary o f International Relations, (London: 
Penguin Books, 1998). p. 5.
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ramifications, both short-term and long-term, from the exploitation and 
extraction of energy reserves upon the Caspian littoral states. This analysis will 
be based on the discussion of the preceding chapters.
10
' . .
M I 1S^
Mangghyshla^^^ ^ , ,  S#
£ h *  ^  Shevche
S  . ■
a  *p v vg ||pLopatjn -T
^SÜfßARöK;Lajjmärfflriä,
p - r3®*k * " I narlawi
« S a "1
3 p g i ¥ -
K &
28The Caspian Sea and its immediate littoral region
28 Selected section from National Geographical Map Caspian Region Promise and Peril 
(National Geographic Society: Washington, 1999).
11
Chapter One
Why the Interest in the Caspian Basin ?
To the novice, the reason for the interest in the Caspian basin are the significant 
energy reserves waiting to be properly exploited. Whilst it is quite correct to 
realise the importance of the hydrocarbon based energy reserves in the region, it 
would be erroneous to focus only on this element, even though the Tengiz field 
in western Kazakstan is reputed to be the largest oil field to be discovered 
anywhere in the world since the 1970s1. The reserves themselves are, as 
mentioned earlier, but one aspect and, according to this thesis, are not the 
exclusive over-arching ‘prize’ that various actors are seeking to win. It is the 
contention of this thesis that the real prize are the transportation routes that will 
be used to enable the delivery of these reserves to regional and world markets. In 
particular, which directions these transportation routes will go, and of equal 
importance, where they don’t, or in the case of possible routes via the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, where they are not allowed to go.
The winners will be those actors who control access to the potential pipeline 
routes, those that are able to charge transit fees, and those actors whose product 
is ultimately exported. This is why there are geopolitical and geostrategic 
implications in the exploitation and extraction of Caspian basin energy reserves. 
This determinant distinguishes the Caspian from other energy basins, such as the 
Persian Gulf, and in part helps explain why, for the Caspian region, export routes 
are initially far more important than the actual reserves. This is not to suggest, 
however, that these two issues are mutually exclusive, for they most certainly are 
not. The issue of reserves and export routes are interconnected in several ways. 
Obviously commercial reasons do dictate to the immediate viability of 
exploration, and if hydrocarbons are found, these need to be of sufficient quantity 
to justify further expense in extraction. The question that has been asked is 
whether there are enough reserves to justify the expense, and the trouble is no- 
one can seem to agree how much there is.
1 Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics o f Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). p. 37.
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How much is there ?
As mentioned previously the exact amount of oil in the Caspian, proven, yet to 
be proven and YTF (Yet-to-find), has generally been reported at around 200 
billion barrels, equivalent to the combined reserves of Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates. If this figure is correct than the Caspian is the second largest 
field outside the Arabian peninsula, yet still is behind Saudi Arabia which has 
proven reserves in excess of 260 billion barrels . However this figure, of 200 
billion, is the product of pure speculation, and geopolitical fanfare. Terry 
Adams, former president of the Azerbaijan International Oil Company (AIOC), 
has said that the YTF figure, is both flawed and commercially meaningless. The 
figure, according to Adams, reflects ‘the concept of an Ultimate Reserve, in 
which oil would fill every conceivable trap, with no exploration risk’2 3. This 
overly optimistic assessment is in contrast to the view held during Soviet times 
that the Caspian oil fields, especially around Baku, were widely perceived as 
approaching exhaustion4. Obviously both assessments cannot be correct, but 
they can both be wrong. In oil exploration, as in many risk based ventures, it is 
wise to err on the side of conservatism, and this thesis agrees.
The term ‘reserves’, according to Colin Campbell, ‘refers to prudent estimates of 
what remains to be produced from known fields at that time and does not include 
amounts left to discover in new fields’5. According to Ebneyousef, the proven 
oil reserves of the south Caspian basin exceed those of the North Sea6. The 
North Sea countries (Norway and Scotland/United Kingdom) between them
2 Amy Meyers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “The Myth of the Caspian ‘Great Game’: The Real 
Geopolitics of Energy” Survival, Volume 40, Number 4, (Winter 1998-1999). p. 114.
2 Terry Adams, “Caspian Hydrocarbons, the Politicisation of Regional Pipelines, and the 
Destabilisation of the Caucasus” Caucasian Regional Studies, Volume 5 Issue 1 & 2 at 
www.ceps.be/Pubs/Caucasus/adams.htm [11/08/2000].
4 Geoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson/ Australian Institute 
of International Affairs, 1973). p. 33.
5 Colin J. Campbell, “Letter to the Editor (of Foreign Affairs)” (8 January 2000) at 
www.oilcrisis.com/campbell/foreignaffairs200001.htm [07/08/2000]. In this letter Campbell 
rebuts an article by Jaffe and Manning “The Shocks of a World of Cheap Oil”.
6 Hossein Ebneyousef, “Caspian Oil and Gas Development: Situation and Prospects”, in Silk 
Road, Volume One, Number One (October 1997). p. 10.
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contain estimated proven reserves of 16 billion barrels7. Australia by comparison
o
has proven reserves of 2.9 billion barrels .
Nevertheless, although the Caspian is not another Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait, the 
proven hydrocarbon reserves are still significant, at the very least for internal and 
regional consumption, whilst the possible reserves are quite simply astounding, if 
they are to be believed. The modest increases in proven reserves, as the 
following tables clearly demonstrate, should be taken into consideration when 
comparing the increases in unproven/YTF quantity. These unproven amounts 
according to the EIA have risen 60 billion barrels in three years. The proven 
reserves are what matters when it comes to exploitation. It should also be noted 
that whilst the Caspian is a modest field, when compared with the Middle East, 
some of the hydrocarbon actors actively involved in the region are not. In 
particular LUKoil, the Major Russian Oil Company that recently acquired Getty 
Petroleum in the US9 has proven reserves of some 23 Billion Barrels under its 
control, of which over 60 percent are concentrated in West Siberia10. Chevron is 
also another extremely significant actor. One of the original Seven Sisters* 11, 
Chevron has already consumed another sister (Gull), and is in the process of 
merging with Texaco, yet another original sister. If actors such as these are 
involved then it is difficult to believe that the amounts in question are not 
commercially viable, irrespective of the price of crude oil.
7 “Oil”, BP Amoco Statistical review o f World Energy 2000 at 
www.bpamoco.com/worldenergy/oil [05/12/2000].
8 ibid.
9 “LUKoil to Acquire Getty in First Acquisition of Publicly Held US Company by a Russian 
Corporation” Press Release, (3 November, 2000), via LUKoil email list.
10 “OAO LUKoil has total reserves of 23 billion barrels of oil and 6.6 trillion cubic feet of gas” 
Press Release, (29 August, 2000), via LUKoil email list.
11 The Seven Sisters were the original oil companies that developed the Iranian and Arabian oil 
fields; Exxon (Esso), Royal Dutch/Shell, BP, Gulf, Texaco, Mobil and Socal (Chevron). The 
French firm Elf is often mentioned as the eighth sister. Exxon, Mobil and Chevron are from the 
original Rockefeller Standard Oil Group. There are only four sisters left; BP, recently merged 
with Amoco, Mobil and Exxon recently merged, Chevron seeking to merge with Texaco and the 
stand alone Royal Dutch/Shell. See Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters (New Edition) 
(Sevenoaks: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993).
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Table 1.1 Selected Caspian Oil and Gas Reserves 
Proven and Possible (1992) 12
P r o v e n
O il*
Possible
Oil*
Total
Oil*
Proven
Gas**
Possible
Gas**
Total
Gas**
Azerbaijan
1 .2 4 5.2 19 19 38
Kazakstan
3 .3 12 15.3 15 35 60
Turkmenistan
1 .4 3 4.4 189 175 364
T o t a l
5 .9 19 2 4 .9 2 2 3 2 2 9 4 5 2
billion barrels 
trillion cubic feet
Table 1.2 Caspian Oil and Gas Reserves Proven and Possible (199 7)13
Proven
Oil*
Possible
Oil*
Total
Oil*
Proven
Gas**
Possible
Gas**
Total
Gas**
Azerbaijan 3 .6 -1 1 27.0 31-38 11 35 46
Russia 0 .2 5.0 5.2 N/A N/A N/A
Kazakstan 1 0 -1 6 85 95-101 53-83 88 141-171
Turkmenistan 1 .5 32.0 33.5 98-155 159 257-314
Iran 0 12.0 12.0 0 11 11
T O T A L 1 5 .1 -2 8 .7 161 1 7 6 -1 8 9 1 6 2 -2 4 9 2 9 3 4 5 5 - 5 4 2
billion barrels 
trillion cubic feet
12 “Petroleum in the Muslim Republics of the CIS: More Oil for OPEC ?”, cited in John Roberts, 
Caspian Pipelines (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996). p. 4.
13 Figures from ‘Table 1: Caspian Oil and Gas Resources’ (amended), Rajan Menon, “Central 
Asia’s Foreign Policy and Security Challenges: Implications for the United States” NBR Analysis 
Volume 6, Number 4 (1995). p. 11. These figures originated with the US Energy Administration 
Country Analysis Brief: Caspian Sea Region, October 1997.
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Table 1.3 Caspian Oil and Gas Reserves Proven and Possible (2000) 4
Proven
O il*
Possible
Oil*
Total
Oil**
Proven
Gas**
Possible
Gas**
Total
Gas**
Azerbaijan 3.6-12 .5 32 36-45 11 35 46
Russia 2.7 14 17 N/A N/A N/A
Kazakstan 10.0-17.6 92 102-110 53-83 88 141-171
Turkmenistan 1.7 80 82 98-155 159 257-314
Iran 0.1 15 15 0 11 11
T otal 18.1-34.6 233 251-268 162-249 293 455-542
billion barrels 
trillion cubic feet
Table 1.4 Caspian Proven Oil Reserves (Thousand Millions)15
A t end 1979 At end 1989 A t end 1999 A t end 1999 A t end 1999
barrels barrels barrels tonnes W orld  T ota l
Azerbaijan N /A N/A 7.0 1.0 0.7%
Russian Federation N /A N/A 48.6 6.7 4.7%
Kazakstan N /A N/A 8.0 1.1 0.8%
Turkmenistan N /A N/A 0.5 0.1 t
Uzbekistan N /A N/A 0.6 0.1 t
Other FSU N /A N/A 0.7 0.1 0.1%
T otal FSU 67.0 58.4 65.4 9.0 6.3%
f  less than 0.05 percent
14 “Caspian Tables, Maps” (June 2000) United States Energy Information Administration at 
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html [05/12/2000].
15 “Oil”, loc. cit.
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Table 1.5 Middle East Proven Oil Reserves (Thousand Million)'6
A t  e n d  1 9 7 9 A t  e n d  1 9 8 9 A t  e n d  1 9 9 9 A t  e n d  1 9 9 9 A t  e n d  1 9 9 9
b a r r e ls b a r r e ls b a r r e ls to n n e s W o r ld  T o t a l
Iran 5 8 .0 92.9 89.7 12.3 8.7%
Iraq 3 1 .0 100.0 112.5 15.1 10.9%
Kuwait 6 8 .5 97.1 96.5 13.3 9.3%
Oman 2 .4 4.3 5.3 0.7 0.5%
Qatar 3 .8 4.5 3.7 0.5 0.4%
Saudi Arabia 1 6 6 .5 257.6 263.5 36.0 25.5%
Syria 2 .0 1.7 2.5 0.4 0.3%
United Arab Emirates 2 9 .4 98.1 97.8 12.6 9.4%
Yemen - 4.0 4.0 0.5 0.4%
Other Middle East 0 .2 0.1 0.1 t t
T o t a l  M id d le  E a s t 3 6 1 .8 6 6 0 .3 6 7 5 .7 9 1 .5 6 5 .4 %
t  less than 0.05 percent
Ties that Bind
The diverse Newly Independent States (NIS) in the Caspian region are not stand­
alone actors capable of independently achieving the desired outcomes from their 
promising of the energy sector/s. They are dependent on both external and 
regional support to achieve their individual aims. They need outside capital 
investment to develop their hydrocarbon reserves, and they need access to 
pipelines and transport corridors to export these reserves. Partly as a result of the 
processes involved in the actual formation of the various republics in the 1920s, 
as well as having similar social and political pressures, these regional actors are 
tied to each other. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union turned ‘inter-republic 
economic dependence into international dependence and interdependence among
16 ibid.
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independent sovereign states’17. As Olcott mentions, ‘the region is heavily 
connected, and problems in one state easily spread to another.. .Trans-Caspian 
ties are rapidly growing stronger’18. Some of these problems Olcott alludes to 
are conflict-based, and Central Asia and the Caucasus, as a region, is replete with 
examples of confrontation that has affected neighbouring states.
There are other concerns that are shared by these actors besides that of regional 
conflict and instability. Social and economic problems are increasing as the 
anticipated wealth from the energy reserves has not been as readily forthcoming 
as was originally expected. As a result the overall health of some of the region’s 
economies has been decreasing, amidst fears that with growing dependence on 
the sizeable energy reserves, they are showing signs of ‘Dutch Disease’19. This 
fear of Dutch Disease is because of the very public stance that a number of key 
actors in the region have taken regarding reliance on energy reserves as the sole, 
or major source of revenue.
The conflict-based issues have already had an impact on transportation routes, as 
the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Chechnya readily demonstrate. The 
continuing conflict in Afghanistan has had a significant impact, especially for 
Turkmenistan, in regards to its plans to export gas to the burgeoning South Asian 
economies. The conflict in Chechnya has highlighted the impact that a localised 
conflict will have on non-contiguous actors like Azerbaijan who are reliant on 
pipelines that traverse these zones of conflict. Unrest in one state is very likely 
to impact on another, particularly if the conflict affects the transport corridor for 
oil and gas reserves. This, as Olcott correctly ascertains, will have ‘serious
17 Zhuangzhi Sun, “Central Asia’s Transition to a Market Economy: An Analytical Comparison 
with China”, in Yongjin Zhang, and Rouben Azizian, (Eds.). Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders: 
Chinese and Russian Perspectives o f the Central Asian Conundrum (London: Macmillian Press, 
1998). p. 158.
18 Martha Brill Olcott, “Pipelines and Pipe Dreams: Energy Development and Caspian Society”, 
Journal o f International Affairs, Volume 53, Number 1, (Fall, 1999), p. 306.
19 ‘Dutch Disease’, an economic term, refers to the situation where there is serious disruption in 
the secondary sectors of the economy, invariably but not always agriculture and manufacturing, 
as a result of relying on the benefits of petroleum related activities. The term originates from the 
economic syndrome that plagued the Netherlands’ economy during the 1960s and the 1970s 
when the Dutch neglected their manufacturing sector and relied too heavily on the oil and gas 
income to support high cost social services.
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potential implications for the development of oil and gas in landlocked 
countries’ . As Heslin clearly states, ‘most pipeline routes from the Caspian 
region are affected by actual or latent conflict situations’ . Without a safe and 
reliable corridor for the export of oil and gas, the size and the quality of the 
reserves are of little benefit except for domestic consumption. The continuing 
impasse regarding the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea is another 
example of the inter-connectivity of the NIS within Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, as it affects not only possible Trans-Caspian pipeline development, but 
also prospects of the validity of sovereignty pertaining to energy reserve fields.
It is only through examining the manifold influences on pipeline development 
and energy reserve exploration, that a clearer understanding of the significance of 
the Caspian basin and the importance of the region to local and international 
relations and world politics will emerge. Some commentators, such as 
Brzezinski, believe that,
Whoever controls or dominates access to the region is the one most 
likely to win the geopolitical and economic prize. It is this 
consideration that has made the pipeline issue so central to the future 
of the Caspian basin and Central Asia .
It would seem that Brzezinski is correct, especially when consideration is given 
to the task of exploration in a remote (and disputed) inland body of water, such 
as the Caspian Sea. Access is not just about extraction of energy reserves it is 
about gaining entry into the region as well.
Whilst issues relating to transportation of energy reserves have been mentioned, 
the issue of transportation into the region for exploration is also a factor.
20 Olcott (1999), op. cit.. p. 320.
21 Shelia N. Heslin, “Key Constraints to Pipeline Development: Status, Significance and 
Outlook”, Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future o f Central Asia and the Caucasus 
Working Paper, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (April 1998) at 
www.riceinfor.rice.edu/projects/baker/publications/efcac2.html [28/12/98].
22 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic 
Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). p. 140.
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Exploration of possible fields within the Caspian Sea itself requires the use of 
semi-submersible off-shore drilling platforms. Transportation, in this case the 
conveyance of offshore drilling rigs into the region, presents a major hurdle to 
long-term development of the Caspian energy sector. For all the fanfare of major 
investment there are only two assembly yards on the Caspian Sea equipped to 
either manufacture or refurbish offshore drilling rigs. One is in the north at 
Astrakhan, and the other is in Primorsk near Baku. In order for offshore rigs to 
reach the Caspian from any location, they must be firstly cut apart, floated down 
the Volga and then rebuilt. As Soligo and Jaffe attest, the geography of the 
region plays a large role in the limitations in off-shore exploration . According 
to Offshore Rig Locator, there are currently six rigs active in the Caspian out of a 
total world-wide fleet of 140 active rigs24. However upon further investigation, it 
would appear that from this group only two are able to meet international drilling 
standards for safety and efficiency .
The Stages of Interest in Caspian Energy Reserves
Initially the interest was in the sheer magnitude of the amount of oil and gas that 
was perceived to be contained within the region. The initial interest however, 
quickly evolved to embrace the issue of transportation of the oil and gas to 
possible markets. This corollary naturally resulted in geopolitical and
23 Ronald Soligo and Amy Myers Jaffe, “The Economics of Pipeline Routes: The Conundrum of 
Oil Exports from the Caspian Basin”, Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future o f Central 
Asia and the Caucasus Working Paper, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (April, 
1998) at www.riceinfo.rice.edu/projects/baker/publications/pipelines.html [21/12/98],
24 Offshore Rig Locator cited in “Semi-Submersibles”, World Oil, (December 1999) at 
www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m3159/12_220/60004638/print.html [18/09/2000].
25 Dean E. Gaddy, “Rig Clubs help alleviate Caspian Sea drilling Shortage” Oil and Gas Journal
November 8, 1999 at www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m3115/45_9757888215/print.html
[14/09/2000],
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geostrategic predictions of the region being a new ‘Great Game’“ . While the 
attraction of the riches that are to be found in the region may have periodically 
waned to outside observers and interests, it is important to remember that the 
politics of this region has continued to be of vital strategic interest to the Russian 
Federation, and of course to the nation-states of the Caspian basin themselves. 
This association with the ‘Great Game’ merely serves to provide a forum for an 
outdated cliche and seeks to dis-empower the nation-states of the region.
The interest in the region and its energy reserves, has occurred, thus far, in three 
distinct stages. The first was in 1990, when it was revealed that Mikhail 
Gorbachev had secretly instigated negotiations with the United States oil 
company Chevron to develop the giant Tengiz oil field in Western Kazakstan . 
However it was to take several years before the actual specifics of the project 
were agreed upon. Only at the end of the very end of the negotiations was 
Nursultan Nazarbaev, then First Secretary of the Kazak Communist Party, who 
later became President of the independent Kazakstan, made aware of the deal. It 
was not until June 1991 that Moscow finally ceded control of Kazakstan's 
mineral resources to Alma-Ata (Almaty)*" .
The second stage was ushered in by the large scale investment in the region, 
most notably in Azerbaijan, from a host of MNCs. Turkmenistan also was 
successful in securing foreign investment, by 1994 more than 280 joint-venture 
agreements for hydrocarbon exploration totalling some 3 Billion dollars had been 
signed . Negotiations for the largest singular investment project in the region,
26 The ‘Great Game’ refers to the period in the nineteenth century when England and Russia 
sought to out manoeuvre each other in the broader Central Asian region. Even though each 
sought to defend its territory by expansion, it was widely perceived by many to be the ‘Great 
Game’ for world domination. Some have suggested that the term ‘Great Game’ itself comes 
from the novel ‘Kim' (originally written in 1901). Kim tells the story of Kimball O’Hara (Kim) 
who was recruited into the British Secret Service and as a result the reader is introduced to the 
‘Great Game’. See Rudyard Kipling Kim (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics, 1993). Others 
such as Morgan cite that the use first appeared in around 1840. Gerald Morgan, Anglo-Russian 
Rivalry in Central Asia: 1810-1895, (London: Frank Cass, 1981). pp. 15-16. Nevertheless the 
term is associated in the main with Kipling.
27 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs (2nd Edition), (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995). p. 
267.
28 ibid.
29 Sun, ibid, p. 159.
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the Azerbaijan International Oil Company (AIOC), began in 1991, it was not 
until September 1994 however, that agreement on consortium members of the 
AIOC and share allocations was finally reached. The investment and 
involvement in the AIOC came from both major and minor operators such as 
British Petroleum (BP)30, Amoco, Unocal, Pennzoil, Exxon, Itcchu (Japan), 
Delta-Nmir (Saudi-US), TPAQ (Turkey), Statoil (Norway), Ramco (Scotland) 
and importantly Russia’s major oil company -  LUKoil, as well as the State Oil 
Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR)31. The specifics of these negotiations, that 
were finalised in 1994, resulted in an estimated 8 Billion dollars of capital 
investment being committed to the development of the Azeri oil industry . As 
with a number of proposals regarding oil and gas exploration in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus political intrigue preceded, and followed, these negotiations.
Prior to the signing off on this contract there was a ‘bloodless’ coup d ’etat in 
July 1993 that saw the then anti-Russian, and nationalist President of Azerbaijan, 
Abulfaz Elchibey, deposed just as he was to sign off on the then current AIOC 
project with oil companies that did not include Russian interests33. The new 
President, Heydar Aliyev, was perceived to be more supportive of Russian 
interests in the region. Shortly after the signing of the ‘Deal of the Century’34 as 
it subsequently became known, the simmering Chechen conflict erupted into a 
full-scale secessionist war, when Boris Yeltsin, then President of the Russian 
Federation, ordered military ‘intervention’ on 11 December 1994. This conflict, 
and that the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline passes directly through Grozny, 
capital of irrendentist Chechnya is no coincidence when considering the 
geopolitical intrigue surrounding pipeline politics. That conflict (1994-1996), 
and the current one in Chechnya (1999-2000), are salient examples of the 
importance of pipeline transportation routes. Some, such as John Roberts,
30 At this stage BP and Amoco had not merged and are accordingly at this stage treated as 
separate entities.
31 Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, Towards the Control o f  Oil Resources in the Caspian Region. 
(Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1999). pp. 170-174.
32 Forsythe, op. cit.„ p. 39.
33 ibid., p. 15.
34 The origins for this title are varied and is also referred to as the “Contract of the Century”.
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a
postulate that this conflict has more to do with ‘nationalism, relations between 
the centre and periphery in the Russian Federation and the specific circumstances 
of Chechenia itself35 than with the importance of Grozny itself as a conduit for 
oil. Whilst the reasons Roberts cites are notable, one cannot downplay the 
importance of pipeline routes as a significant factor in Russian military 
engagement.
The third, and current phase of interest, from mid-1997 onwards, has unfolded as 
a result of the formulation of a specific American policy towards Central Asia 
and the Caucasus during the Clinton administration. Before this, a 
comprehensive American stance towards the region, and in particular its energy 
reserves, was severely lacking. For a number of reasons there was no all- 
embracing document describing clear-cut US objectives. There were only three 
issues that originally preoccupied the US in the region. The removal of 
thermonuclear weapons (affecting Kazakstan), Clause 907 of the Freedom 
Support Act36 relating to restriction of all forms of aid to Azerbaijan (because of 
its conflict with neighbouring Armenia), and the policy of ‘dual containment’ 
towards Iran and Iraq. American policy makers took the view that the region 
was in the almost exclusive orbit of the Russian Federation. In spite of the fact 
that it appeared that America was not interested in the region, in terms of 
geopolitical and geostrategic imperatives, US embassies appeared in all of the 
region’s capital cities within the first year after the fragmentation of the USSR.
These three phases of interest also coincide with peaks in published academic 
works and conferences pertaining to the wider Central Asian region . It comes 
as no surprise that the focus of academic attention has perspicaciously shifted 
towards the rising importance of the geopolitical and geostrategic implications of
35 John Roberts, Caspian Pipelines, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996). p. 
21.
36 Freedom Support Act, the full and correct title is Russian and Emerging Eurasian Democracies 
and Open Markets Support Act. Section 907 specifically prohibits US aid to Azerbaijan with the 
exception of nonproliferation and disarmament assistance. The removal of clause 907 is linked to 
the end of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over territorial issues such as Nagorno- 
Karabakh.
37 A cursory reading of the bibliography indicates the increase in academic output during these 
periods.
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the Caspian basin energy reserves. Prior to the advent of energy politics, 
discussion on the region tended to focus on three main themes: the perceived rise 
of Islamic fundamentalism, the use of ethno-nationalism as an avenue for 
potential hostilities, and the various discussions on the emergence, or lack
o
thereof, of democratic institutions . These important themes naturally still exist, 
but they have now been superimposed within the framework of energy 
geopolitics.
Justification
This thesis adopts an approach whereby the Caspian Region will be examined 
through the dual prism of geopolitics and geostrategy. In doing so an attempt 
will be made to provide an analysis that may be useful in assessing both littoral 
and non-littoral actors as well as the role of MNCs in exploiting the energy 
reserves and the impact that this exploitation will have on the region. A number 
of actors are often overlooked when discussing Caspian energy politics. These 
actors include Ukraine, China (PRC), India, and East Asia in general. The role 
of Ukraine is important as it seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian energy 
supplies by tapping into Caspian energy reserves. The growing significance of 
the PRC and its influence in the region has received scant attention, as has the 
rising demand in India and East Asia for petroleum products to sustain economic 
growth.
A factor in the current commentary for not examining these regions, as well as 
pipeline route options, can be attributed to the preponderance of the US 
governments insistence on its preferred direction of pipeline/s routes. The US 
position, under the Clinton Administration, is strongly supportive of an east-west 
route, that by-passes Iran. This thesis asserts that the direction that the US is 
promoting is driven by its own myopic assessments of the region. Because of 
this, the US is dictating a direction that seeks to only serve its newly found
38 For a very good discussion on the problems associated with Democratisation in the CAR and 
the Caucasus see Karen Darwisha and Bruce Parrot (eds.)., Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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immediate purpose and, when assessed critically, is found to be lacking, as well 
as going in a direction that impacts negatively on the political stability of the 
Caspian region. As will be discussed further, a direction that has more beneficial 
rewards for the exporting states; Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Turkmenistan, is 
west-east and south towards India and China, via Iran and/or Afghanistan, not 
west to Europe via Turkey, either through the Bosphorus, or via Yumurtalik, the 
exit port for the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.
Geopolitics
As O Tuathail and Agnew succinctly state ‘Geopolitics, as many have noted, is a 
term which is notoriously difficult to define’39. As such any attempt to 
adequately define geopolitics is akin to attempting to define what democracy is, 
and given the variety of democracy prevalent in the CAR and the Caucasus this 
would provide several conflicting versions to the Western European tradition. 
Robertson has suggested ‘Democracy is the most valued and perhaps the vaguest 
of political concepts in the modem world’40. Democracy as a concept and in 
practice has however, certainly existed far longer than geopolitics. In seeking to 
examine the Caspian region through the framework of geopolitics, Graham 
Fuller has suggested that ‘for anyone interested in geopolitics, the Caspian may 
present itself as the ultimate challenge’41. The reason for it being the ultimate 
challenge in geopolitics are the copious number of variables, as well as the 
number of actors involved.
Geopolitics, when reduced to its base level, is primarily a method of foreign 
policy analysis that rests on the physical geography of the actors involved, and 
how this geography correlate to politics. It is about the relationship between 
geography and politics, a relationship that is dynamic. Yet it is much more than
39 Gearöid Ö Tuanthail and John Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical 
Reasoning in American Foreign Policy”, in Gearöid O Tuanthail et. al. (eds.) The Geopolitics 
Reader, (London; Routledge, 1998). p. 79.
40 David Robertson, Dictionary> of Politics 2nd Edition (London: Penguin Books, 1993). p. 129.
41 Graham Fuller, “Geopolitical Dynamics of the Caspian Region” Caspian Crossroads
Magazine, Volume 3, Number 2, (Fall, 1997) at
www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/casp.htm [28/12/1998].
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this, it is also a 'foil to idealism, ideology and human will'42. According to Sloan 
and Gray;
One of the aims of geopolitics is to emphasise that political 
predominance is a question not just of having power in the sense of 
human or material resources, but also of the geographical context 
within which that power is exercised43.
This is confirmed when a careful examination of the Caspian is undertaken. It is 
not just the political will or intellect of the leaders of the various actors involved 
that has thus far determined the course of events in the region. It is also the 
natural environment and the geography of the region that has exercised an 
inordinate amount of leverage in the machinations of the political web of energy 
reserve exploitation.
A brief word is required refuting the notion that the validity of geopolitics as a 
methodology for foreign policy interpretation has become redundant due to the 
apparently more encompassing notion of geo-economics, the globalising effect of 
Information Technology, and globalisation in general. Granted there are a 
growing number of examples of fortunes being made which are not restricted to 
the confirms of geography, however the logic of suggesting geographical 
location is now no longer important is severely flawed. Whilst it may be true 
that economic power can be far superior to political power in given situations, it 
is erroneous to discard the geographical impact that a nation-state’s position may 
have in regards to policy formulation simply because of the advent of the Internet 
and globalisation, or that it might be ‘the end of history’. In a similar vein, the 
dramatic rise of new technology based industries fuelled the myth that old world 
stocks, shares and companies are passe. The corollary argument is often used 
with the increased use of non-fossil fuels in transport, and that the petroleum 
industry is declining in importance. However, the near 40 percent write-off on 
the NASDAQ in 2000, should remind stock market bulls and some analysts of
42 Ö Tuanthail and Agnew, loc. cit.
42 Geoffrey Sloan and Colin S. Gray, “Why Geopolitics” The Journal o f Strategic Studies, 
Volume 22, Number 2/3, (June-September, 1999), p. 2.
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the importance of old world companies. This is especially so given the fact that 
energy generation for world industry, apart from a number of localised 
exceptions that rely on thermo-nuclear energy, is heavily dependent upon fossil 
fuels. The information society, as Dalby rightly mentions,
still depends upon fuel supplies to run the vehicles and to 
provide electrical power for the computers and the telephone 
exchanges. Oil supplies from Saudi Arabia or elsewhere in the 
Middle East are still essential to the economies of the post­
industrial world.44
The post-industrial and emerging industrial world, in particular South Asia, still 
require these reserves for use as a primary source for energy generation. The 
ability of the various actors in Central Asia and the Caucasus to exploit their oil 
and gas reserves is very much dependent upon their respective geographical 
locations. As a result of this dependence, geopolitics will continue to remain a 
viable consideration in foreign policy analysis of these actors.
The concept of political geography remains a critical consideration in 
international affairs4'̂ and it follows that a failure to utilise this knowledge will 
weaken the position of an actor. Those actors, political and petroleum based, 
seeking to exploit Caspian basin energy reserves face a unique situation. In order 
to transport the oil and/or gas whichever direction they pursue will involve 
negotiation with another actor/s to either use their facilities and infrastructure 
and/or solicit permission to build a pipeline across their sovereign territory to 
enable transportation to markets. A further geographical-cum-legal obstacle is 
the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea which directly impacts on both 
exploration and transportation options. These problems completely differentiate 
the Caspian from the Persian Gulf, a region that has ready access to open waters 
albeit through one of the major chock-points: The Strait of Hormuz and minimal 
territorial legal differences. Although some Gulf countries do have additional
44 Simon Dalby, “Geopolitics, Knowledge and Power at the End of the Century”, in Gearöid Ö 
Tuanthail et. al. (eds.) The Geopolitics Reader, (London; Routledge, 1998). p. 308.
4:1 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 37.
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pipelines crossing neighbouring states, it needs to be stated that the main export 
route is not via another country, as is the case in the Caspian basin. The only 
major exception to the rule is Iraq which has export pipelines extending through 
other countries, most notably, as far as this study is concerned, through Turkey to 
Ceyhan. A pipeline that has essentially remained dormant due to UN sanctions. 
The future development of Caspian basin hydrocarbon reserves, specifically the 
problem of their transportation, and related issues such as the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea, is providing significant geopolitical leverage for a rearrangement of 
the relationships not only within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
but elsewhere.
Geostrategy
Geostrategy is a subset of geopolitics. Like geopolitics, geostrategy is concerned 
with the geography of a region, but the focus shifts from the higher level 
discourse to a level immediately concerned with the strategic advantages a 
political actor has due to its own geographical location. Kemp and Harkavy state 
that geostrategy refers to the ‘control of, or access to, spatial areas, such as land 
and water, that has an impact on the security and economic prosperity of 
nations’46. The Eurasian steppe has provided a number of examples of 
geostrategic machinations of which the most current and salient is the 
construction of pipelines. Consequently, the process of seeking to construct 
various pipelines, and the transportation of oil and gas has acquired deep political 
implications -  both regional and international, because of the various actors 
involved who are seeking to exploit the geography of the region.
The Great Game for the Heartland of the World ?
In examining the issue of politics in Central Asia and the Caucasus in general, 
and pipeline politics in the Caspian basin in particular, similarities are often 
drawn with two historical themes found within the Eurasian steppe. The first
4<> Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East, 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/ Brookings Institution Press: Washington, 1997).
p. 8.
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theme, based on the notion of the ‘Great Game’ stems from the 19th Century 
Anglo-Russian rivalry in Turkistan, Iran and Afghanistan47. The reason for the 
‘Great Game’ was the rising geopolitical importance of the countries and 
territories of what was then referred to as Inner Asia, essentially modem Central 
Asia. This region itself was a means to an end: the means was imperialistic 
subjugation and control, and the end was the defence of the national interests of 
the European powers concerned - England and Russia.
a o
After a period of some three centuries of relative isolation from colonial 
powers, and pre-industrial stagnation, competing security interests of the great 
powers of the day propelled the region onto the chessboard of European 
diplomacy. British fears for India, and the belief that Tsarist Russia was looking 
for a warm water port increased with every Russian advance further into Central 
Asia which was greatly aided by the expanding railway network. The origins for 
this ‘fear’ originated from the 50,000 man force that Tsar Paul I sent towards 
India in 1800. The force was sent, according to Jukes, in ‘response to a French 
suggestion that their appearance on the frontiers of the subcontinent would spark 
a native uprising’49. Shortly after this Paul was assassinated and his successor, 
Alexander I, recalled the force. The belief that Russia had its eyes on India was 
nevertheless to remain. By the late nineteenth century the distance between the 
two empires had been reduced from over two thousand miles to a mere twenty 
miles in the Pamirs50. Lord Curzon, viceroy of India, speculated however, that
47 See Morgan, op. cit., Edward Ingram, Beginning o f the Great Game in Asia 1828-1834, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Edward Ingram, Britain’s Persian connection 1798-1828: 
Prelude to the Great Game in Asia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Peter Hoprik, The Great 
Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, (New York: America Inc, 1992); Anthony 
Verrier, Francis Younghusband and the Great Game, (London: Cape, 1991). A number of recent 
publications about contemporary events also utilise the familiarity of the ‘Great Game’ such as 
Ahmed Rashid, Taliban Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2000) and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (ed.), From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the 
New Great Game, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1994).
48 Black, Cyril E., et. al. The Modernization o f Inner Asia, (New York; M. E. Sharp, 1991). p. 
15.
49 Geoffrey Jukes, “The Soviet Far East”, Working Paper Number 1990/2 (Australian National 
University. Department of International Relations), (May 1990). pp. 1-2.
50 Hoprik, op. cit., p. 5.
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Russia was not so much interested in Calcutta, but Constantinople^1. The ‘game’ 
was very much perceived to be about world dominance, regardless of whether 
this was the reality or not. The entire focus of the ‘game’ was the control of 
various regions and countries for their geostrategic standing against the other 
side.
Whilst there are some similarities between the old ‘Great Game’ and the current 
geopolitical manoeuvres it is the contention of this thesis that current geopolitical 
and geostrategic subterfuge does not constitute a new ‘Great Game’. The 
reasons for this are unmistakable; the principle actors have changed and the prize 
is not India, if it ever was. Having said that, it would be erroneous to discard the 
similarity at the geopolitical level. What has not changed is the Realpolitik 
approach of the new actors involved. Previously the two main actors (Russia and 
England) saw their respective positions through the prism of raison d ’etat and 
those actions resulted in a defensive situation. Russia, which protected and 
defended its trade and economic development via the subjugation of the various 
‘unruly Turkic tribes’ through oeuvre civilisatrice , can be seen as a defensive 
advancement. The building of the Trans-Caspian railway network contributed to 
the colonisation of the various Khanates in Central Asia, but this stemmed from 
an initial defensive, and colonialist, position of protecting against the disruptions 
that the various Turkic groups posed to Russian trade. England, in turn, sought 
to protect its own economic jewel in India by seeking to gain control over Iran 
and Afghanistan, thereby creating a bulwark against possible Russian 
encroachments. From a British point of view, defence of India was the central 
issue53. This perception was further strengthened by the advancing Russian 
conquest of Central Asia and the construction of the Trans-Caspian railway to 
Bokhara and Samarkand54.
51 Kemp and Harkavy, op. cit.. p. 37. 
Black, loc. cit.
53 ibid.
54 Kemp and Harkavy, op. cit.. p. 131.
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The current ‘game’ can also be seen from a defensive position, with a wider 
variety of actors involved, with self interest again being the primary reason. It is 
defensive in the sense that the main ‘external’ political actors, Russia and the US, 
each sees their movements in a protective light, as each tries to guard what it sees 
as its own ‘region of influence’. This reason is based in part on the ideological 
structure of the respective polity. This issue of ideology is important, and is a 
factor in the current geopolitical and geostrategic struggle. If there is but one 
continuity between the ‘Great Game’ and the current political machinations, it is 
the dis-empowering of smaller local actors whilst larger external actors seek to 
dominate and subjugate the chessboard at the expense of the former.
This thesis also draws on the theory put forward by the English geographer Sir 
Halford Mackinder in 1904, that the Eurasian Steppe is ‘the heartland of the 
world, and whoever rules the heartland rules the world’55. In discussing 
geopolitics, it is Mackinder who is seen as the principle contributor to this 
approach, although it was Haushofer who actually developed the use of the word 
geopolitik'6. Mackinder’s thesis was in part based upon his notion that the 
strength of maritime supremacy was at an end and a reassertion of land-based 
power was coming, if not already here. A principle element of this was the use 
of railroads as a primary means of transportation, a method that Russia used to its 
great benefit in subjugating the ‘unruly Turkic tribes’ of Central Asia. An 
essential issue in Mackinder’s thesis was overland transportation (railroads) and 
the similarity with transporting oil and gas is not lost on astute readers of world 
history. Hegemony, according to Mackinder, in world politics would shift from 
those who ruled the sea to whomever controlled the ‘pivot area’. Anthony 
Sampson has even suggested that the ‘centre of gravity’ in global energy is
55 This famous maxim which had its conceptual origins in “The Geographical Pivot of History” 
actually appeared in his 1919 book “Democratic Ideas and Reality”.
~ b  Geopolitik, as a theory, originated in Germany and is strongly associated with Karl Haushofer. 
Geopolitik originally meant the exploitation of knowledge to serve the purposes of a national 
regime. As such this concept became closely associated with the Nazis and conquest, and is why 
the concept of geopolitics was much maligned. Geopolitics is a loose translation of Geopolitik.
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shifting to the Caspian Sea region57. The region that Mackinder classified as the 
‘pivot area’ represents, essentially, what is known as Central Asia.
Is not the pivot region of the world’s politics that vast area of Euro- 
Asia which is inaccessible to ships, but in antiquity lay open to horse 
riding nomads, and is today about to be covered with a network of 
railways58.
Referring to Tsarist Russia, Mackinder said that ‘in a world at large she occupies 
the central strategic position held by Germany in Europe’59. Mackinder 
redefined his determination several times, increasing and then finally reducing 
the size of the pivot area and changing its description from ‘pivot area’ to 
‘heartland’. It comes as no surprise then that the American policy of 
containment against the Soviet Union was in part based on Mackinder’s vision 
and of course George Kennan’s famous ‘X’ article in Foreign Affairs of 194760. 
The heartland-rimland thesis became the conceptual basis for the post-1945 
American policy vis-ä-vis the Soviet Union. Relative to Central Asia, control of 
possible pipelines as well as access to the region, Mackinder’s thesis again find 
resonance. Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party in Russia, has 
openly stated that the ‘main geopolitical aim’ is to control the hartlend 
(heartland) as ‘only the attainment of this objective will guarantee the basic 
national security of our state’61. Extremists such as Zyuganov and Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky openly embrace the notion of a ‘resurrection of the Soviet Union 
and its return to the world stage as a superpower’ . It is this heartland region
57 Cited in Menon, ibid., p. 7.
58 Sir Halford J. Mackinder. The Scope and Methods o f Geography and the Geographical Pivot of 
History> (London: Royal Geographic Society, 1951). p. 41.
59 ibid., p. 43.
60 George Kennan “X”, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” Foreign Affairs, Volume 25 (July 
1947), pp. 566-582.
61 John Erickson, “Russia will Not be Trifled with: Geopolitical Facts and Fantasies” The Journal 
of Strategic Studies Volume 22, Numbers 2/3 (June-September 1999), p. 262.
62 Thomas R Pickering. “Russia and the US in the Middle East and Central Asia”. Occasional 
Paper (Australian National University, Centre for Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies) 
(August 1996). p. 5.
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that all of the great powers of the world are involved in. No where else on the 
globe is there the possibility of conflict between the competing interests of the 
Russian Federation and the United States. The rimland, accessible by Russia 
through its overland transportation links, but inaccessible to the maritime based 
US, is a struggle for influence between land-based and maritime based world 
powers and can be interpreted through a geopolitical and geostrategic 
framework.
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Chapter Two
Geological, Environmental and Legal Reality - What is the
Caspian ?
As this study is concerned with geographical subterfuge, it is therefore expedient 
to spend some time discussing the actual physical geography of the Caspian. An 
understanding of the topographical nature of the region will enable a more 
structured approach in assessing the political factors involved in the exploitation 
and extraction of Caspian energy reserves. Knowledge of the physical 
composition of the Caspian will allow informed discussion, regarding the 
geopolitical nature of its energy reserves, possible directions of pipelines, 
environmental considerations, as well as the legal status of the Caspian Sea, to be 
attained.
The Caspian contains both the lowest and the highest points in ‘continental 
Europe’1 2. The lowest is at the north of the Caspian Sea in the Caspian 
Depression, and the highest is Mt Elbrus, 5,633 metres above sea level, in the 
Caucasus range, which is some 800 metres higher than Mont Blanc. In fact there 
are several peaks in the Caucasus range over 4,000 metres, including Kazbek, 
5,033 metres and Tebulos, 4,492 metres. Both of these extremes in the Caspian’s 
terrain play a significant role in determining pipeline direction, and the 
development of Caspian energy reserves. Related to the issue of geography is, of 
course, the topic of the environment and its own strategic merit and value in the 
present discussion. Although often forgotten in discussions pertaining to the 
Caspian, apart from casual reference, this study will seek to introduce the 
environment as an integral element in the current debate . To understand the
1 Of course it could be argued that this region is part of the Asian continent, but for the sake of 
comparison editorial liberty has been taken to emphasis the geological features of the region.
2 As Hekimoglu correctly asserts ‘There are as yet few books available on the Caspian 
environment’. He cites a total of four books, written between 1992 and 1997. Levent 
Hekimoglu, “Caspian Oil and the Environment: Curse or Cure ?”, in Michael Croissant and 
Bülent Aras (eds.). Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region (Westport: Praeger, 1999). p. 
91. Nl. For a recent, as well as depressing, account of the effects of unbridled oil pollution in the 
Caspian Sea cf; Nasrin Mohammad-Pour Dariaie, “Oil Pollution in the Caspian Sea” The Times 
o f Central Asia Wednesday, 2 August, 2000, Volume 2, Issue 30 (73) as of July 27 at 
www.times.kg/2000/N30/fea-04.shtml [02/08/2000],
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importance of the environment one only has to look at the tragedy that is [was] 
the Aral Sea, and the devastation caused by this ecological disaster. 
Accordingly, an examination of environmental factors in the region will be 
explored. Following on from this, the legal status of the Caspian Sea will be 
discussed, as the corollary issue of the sovereignty of the Caspian Sea is pivotal 
to the stable long-tenn development of the regions energy reserves.
An Exceptional Body of Water
Relating to the question of what the Caspian Sea is, whether it is a Sea or Lake, 
one of the few commonalities that all observers seem to be able to agree on is the 
peculiarity of the Caspian Sea. As Golubev rightly states, ‘the Caspian is 
exceptional by many standards’3. It is truly an anomalous body of inland water, 
essentially, but not solely because it is the largest inland body in the world. It is 
also unique because it is some 27 metres below the maritime sea level (MSL), 
yet has over time, repeatedly risen and fallen substantially as a result of ‘natural 
oscillations of the components that make up the water balance’4 5.
Table 2.1 The average water balance of the Caspian Sea, 1900-19855
C om p onent K m V year
River inflow +298
Precipitation on the Sea’s surface +74
Evaporation from the Sea’s surface -370
Outflow to the bay of Kara-Bogaz-Gol -14
Total -12
3 Genady N. Golubev, “Environmental policy-making for sustainable development of the 
Caspian Sea area”, in Iwao Kobori and Michael H. Glantz, (eds.). Central Eurasian Water 
Crisis: Caspian, Aral, and Dead Seas, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998). p. 91.
4 ibid.
5 figures for Table 2.1 from Golubev, ibid., p. 93.
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The Caspian Sea, like other similar bodies of water, is fed from inland rivers and 
in this case, primarily from one river - the Volga - the largest river system in 
Europe6. Importantly the Volga river basin belongs completely to the Russian 
Federation, contains approximately 40 percent of Russia’s population, as well as 
one-third of its industrial and agricultural production7 8. A significant amount of 
pollution, in all forms, originates in the Volga river basin. This is of critical 
importance when considering environmental degradation of the Caspian Sea. 
The entire catchment basin area for the Caspian is 3.5 million square kilometres . 
Granted there are other sizeable inland bodies of water below (the Dead Sea), as 
well as above (Lake Baikal) the open sea level that are exceptional in their own 
right, the Caspian Sea is, however, the largest inland body of water in the world.
The size of the Caspian Sea is staggering when compared with other similar 
reservoirs of water, such as Lake Victoria in Africa, with an area of 68,000 
square kilometres (third largest in the world), or the Great Lakes, including Eire 
and Ontario, between America and Canada with a combined area of 245,000 
square kilometres (second, fourth and fifth largest). The area of the Caspian Sea 
is around 393,000 square kilometres, which is larger than the combined area of 
the next nine largest inland bodies of waters9. With an overall length of some 
1,200 kilometres, and a width that varies between 170-450 kilometres, the 
Caspian contains some 80,000 cubic kilometres of water. Its average depth is 
180 metres with its deepest spot, south of Baku, being some 1,025 metres below 
surface level. The northern region, however, has a very shallow depth of only 6- 
10 metres. It is this region that is home to the sturgeon hatcheries, primarily 
south of Astrakhan in the Volga delta, but also near Atyraü, where the Ural river 
reaches the Caspian Sea. In considering this data, it is important to remember
6 The Volga accounts for approximately 88 percent of the Caspian Sea’s total water input, and is 
by far the largest of the approximately 140 rivers that feed the Caspian. Siamak Namazi, “The 
Caspian’s Environmental Woes” in Hoosang Amirahmadi (ed.). The Caspian Region at a 
Crossroad (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). p. 123.
7 ibid., p. 93.
8 Hekimoglu, op. cit.. p. 84.
9 According to Amineh, in 1929, the area of the Caspian Sea measured 422,000 square 
kilometres. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, Towards the Control o f Oil Resources in the Caspian 
Region, (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1999). p. 144.
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that due to the continued variance in water level these figures are only general 
approximates.
From a geological perspective the territory of the Caspian Sea belongs to two 
different basins; North Caspian (Pricaspian) and South Caspian10. Although the 
Caspian Sea is one complete entity, morphologically it has three distinct regions 
of similar size: northern, middle and southern zones. The proportional volumes 
of these three parts are 1/100, 1/3 and 2/3 of the total volume, with salinity being 
the lowest in the north at 0.2 g/litre and rising to 12-13 g/litre in the southern 
region* 11. In comparison, salinity in the Black Sea is 18 g/litre, whereas open 
oceans have an average of 35 g/litre . All riparian communities around inland 
lakes are exposed to fluctuations in the water level, and those adjacent to the 
Caspian are no different. The Caspian does, however, have a feature that 
differentiates it from other inland bodies of water. A large proportion of the 
riparian land, known as the Caspian Depression, is actually below that of the 
already negative Caspian Sea water level, which leads to wind-driven flooding 
and climate-induced variations in water level, particularly in the northern region.
The Caspian Depression
The Caspian Depression extends from Makhachkala in Dagestan through the 
predominantly Buddhist republic of Kalmykia, all the way east around to 
immediately north of Fort Shevchenko on the Tüpqarghan Tiibegi (peninsula) in 
Western Kazakstan. The lowest topographical elevation of the depression is -24 
metres to that of the level of the Caspian’s water level13. The extent of the 
Caspian Depression corresponds with the northern zone of the Caspian. This 
negative geological characteristic is not limited to the northern zone, as the 
southern zone also has a considerable amount of riparian land that is below the
10 For a concise geological overview of the wider Caspian region see; Manik Talwani, Andrei 
Belopolsky, and Dianne L. Berry, “Geology and Petroleum Potential of Central Asia” 
Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future o f Central Asia and the Caucasus Working Paper. 
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (April 1998) at 
www.riceinfo.rice.edu/projects/baker/publications/gppca/gppca.html [ 15/08/2000],
11 Golubev, op. cit.. p. 92.
12 Hekimoglu, loc. cit.. N3.
12 Talwani, Belopolsky, and Berry, op. cit.
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current level of the Caspian Sea. To the casual observer this may not seem that 
important, most likely because the impact that this geographical feature has on 
the littoral states is hardly ever reported when discussions about energy reserves 
are raised. Ignorance of this issue extends to other sectors as well. In 1995 the 
World Bank’s report on the Caspian’s environmental challenges failed to 
mention the critical issue of sea-level rise14. This is inspite of the fact that 
pipelines from the Tengiz oil field and the old Glavtransneft system hug the 
northern coastline of the Caspian, constantly in danger of being overwhelmed by 
wind-driven flooding. The Tengiz oil field itself is in this depression, although 
some distance inland, yet nevertheless has already experienced flooding. The 
risk of flooding Azerbaijan’s onshore oil fields, south of Baku, is also a very real 
possibility, especially if the Caspian continues to rise.
The hazard posed to the riparian actors energy industry cannot be understated. 
Oil wells and pipelines are exposed to the risk of being permanently flooded, 
because of rising water levels. To date it has not proved possible to predict the 
extent of the water level change let alone provide an answer as to why the Sea is 
again rising. The impact that the damage will cause to infrastructure, and the 
like, because of these fluctuations will increase should the Caspian continue to 
rise, as it has done since 1977.
Impact of the Rising Water Level
The damage that the rising water level has caused, and will continue to cause, 
cannot be ignored, as the diminishing water level of the Aral Sea for so long. It 
is ironic that the declining level of the Aral Sea was used, in the 1970s, to argue 
that the Caspian too would continue to decrease15. It was during the period, from 
the 1930s until the 1970s, that new settlements, roads, ports and oil installations 
were built with the assumption that the sea level would be -28 metres below, 
whereas today it is approaching -26 metres below16. Central planning forgot to
14 Hormoz Goodarzy, “Organizational Response to Caspian’s Environmental Needs” in Hoosang 
Amirahmadi, (ed.). The Caspian Region at a Crossroad (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 
p. 140.
15 Golubev, op. cit.. p. 95.
16 ibid., p. 99.
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consult the local inhabitants as to why they refrained from building large 
facilities close to the shore17. As Kuksa has demonstrated, there are four distinct 
periods in the past 100 years where the Caspian water level has oscillated 
significantly.
Table 2.2 Significant periods of water level change in the Caspian Sea 
since 190018
P eriod C hange
1900-1929 Relative stability of the water balance. The water level oscillated slightly 
around -26.2 metres below sea level.
1930-1941 Water balance deficit of 62 cubic kilometres. Water deficit led to a sharp 
drop in the water level of 1.8 metres.
1942-1977 Modest deficit in the water level of 1.3 metres.
1978-present Positive water balance. The water level has been increasing from its lowest 
point of -29.0 metres in 1977. In 1994, the water level was -26.5 metres, an 
increase of 2.5 metres.
The economic damage already has been extensive and if the water level 
continues to rise, the results will be catastrophic. The Caspian Sea’s ecological 
changes will immediately affect five nations, unlike the Aral Sea disaster19, as 
well as a host of foreign oil and gas companies, that have invested literally 
billions in hard currency into the region. In Iran, since 1989, there have been 
reports of thousands of homes destroyed, with as many as 18 coastal cities 
threatened by rising water levels“ . Flooding in the southernmost city of Astara 
in Azerbaijan, in 1991, resulted in thousands of residents being forced to leave
17 Namazi., op. cit.. pp. 127-128.
18 V.I. Kuksa cited in Golubev, op. cit.. p. 94.
19 Originally the Aral Sea affected only one nation, the Soviet Union. Now the impact of the Aral 
is now felt by not only the Central Asian states of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, but also from a host 
of countries, such as India, who have seen crop degradation from the salt pans produced in the 
Aral basin. These salt pans also contain high levels of pesticides and other chemicals used in the 
cotton farming.
20 “Eighteen cities come under threat as sea level rises in the Caspian”, Greenpeace Climate 
impact database www.greenpeace.org/~climate/database/records/zgpz0339.html [13/05/1999],
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the city21. In Kalmykia, in 1995, wind-driven flooding resulted in 200,000 
hectares being inundated, with over 500 homes destroyed and approximately 
150,000 head of sheep lost22.
In Kazakstan, between 1978 and 1985, an estimated 20,000 square kilometres 
was engulfed by rising sea levels, with 357,000 hectares of agricultural land lost, 
along with 200,000 head of livestock^ . In order to protect the port city of 
Shevchenko (Aqtaü) funding was obtained in 1996 from the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to lengthen the protective quay wall, 
around the port, a further 400 metres as well as raising it 2 metres higher. Ron 
Freeman, Vice President of the EBRD said “EBRD financing will keep the port 
operational by raising the level of cargo berths to protect them from the sea”24. 
The cost for this project is estimated at $54 million dollars .
What long-term impact the rising water level will have on the burgeoning oil and 
gas industries remains to be seen, although early warning signs are quite visible. 
Even with the construction of protective dykes, it would seem impractical to 
continue to build and plan on the current level of the Caspian. A water level at 
-25 metres would result in the loss of 16,500 square kilometres; over 100 
settlements with 100,000 people would be inundated in the Russian Federation 
alone . Already in Astrakhan, 10 percent of agricultural land has been lost, and 
the Martyshi oil field is now covered by half a metre of water . In 
Turkmenistan, rising Caspian levels have damaged oil and gas pipelines around 
the, once again, island town of Cheleken, whereas Kazakstan has had ten cases of
21 “50,000 evacuated as Caspian sea rises”, Greenpeace Climate impact database 
www.greenpeace.org/~climate/database/records/zgpz0845.html [ 13/05/1999].
22 Golubev, op. cit.. p. 92.
23 Namazi, op. cit.. p. 127.
24 “Long-term EBRD financing to rescue Kazak Caspian Port of Aktau” Press Release 16 April 
1996 at www.ebrd.com/english/opera/PRESSREL/prl996/27aprl6.htm [01/12/2000],
25 Namazi, loc. cit.
26 Golubev, op. cit.. p. 99.
27 Namazi, loc. cit.
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severe flooding in the past 25 years alone28. Kemp and Harkavy mention that 
Kazakstan has already seen considerable damage to its oil and gas industry. 
Some 1,400 wells are now submerged, including 127 wells in the Tengiz field 
alone, causing losses in excess of one million barrels. Flooding has advanced in 
some cases up to 43 miles (70 km) inland^ . Namazi states that 20 out of the 32 
oil fields in the Atyrau oblast, a region that contains the Tengiz oil field are high 
risk areas30.
Monoculture and the Environment
When environmental concerns are raised, the tragic fate of the Aral Sea is often 
cited, and so it should be31. However, reference to the Aral's demise is invariably 
couched in derision of the evils of the Soviet system, meaning that such a 
disaster could never happen in the free world. Whilst there is certainly truth to 
the Soviet’s attitude and actions, the real cause of the Aral’s situation stemmed 
not from Soviet planning per se, but rather a narrow-mindedness not entirely 
unique to Soviet planning. Pursuing short-term economic gains over a lengthy 
and extended period of time, without adjusting the process to achieve these initial 
outcomes, was a primary factor in the destruction of the Aral Sea. The unbridled 
expansion into cotton, creating a monoculture is prima facie evidence for such 
myopic planning' . Between 1913 and 1986, land under cultivation increased 
from 648,000 hectares to an astronomical 7,100,000 hectares, enabling over 90 
percent of Soviet cotton to come from the CARs33. In order to irrigate this 
intensive water hungry crop, water from the Aral’s two feeder rivers: Amu Darya
28 Golubev, op. cit.. p. 100.
29 Kemp and Harkavy, op. cit.. p. 136.
30 Namazi, loc. cit.
31 For a disturbing report on the recent impacts of the Aral Sea disaster see Tsuneo Tsukatani. 
“The Aral Sea and socio-economic development” in Iwao Kobori and Michael H. Glantz (eds.). 
Central Eurasian Water Crisis: Caspian, Aral, and Dead Seas (Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press, 1998). pp. 53-88; Also see Michael. H Glanz, et.al. “Tragedy in the Aral Basin: 
Looking Back to Plan Ahead ?”, in Hafeez Malik (ed.). Central Asia Its Strategic Importance 
and Future Prospects (London: Macmillian Press, 1994). pp. 159-194.
32 See James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republics Road to Sovereignty, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).
33 Hooman Peimani, Regional Security and the Future o f Central Asia: The Competition o f Iran, 
Turkey and Russia (Connecticut: Praeger, 1998). p.92.
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and Syr Darya, were diverted into inferior irrigation systems, which has left the 
region with a fast growing desert where a thriving ecosystem once existed34.
Cotton itself was not the sole culprit, but it was indeed the basis for the resulting 
catastrophe that followed. It is completely correct to say that if the was no 
monoculture, in this case cotton, then the Aral Sea would still be alive, instead 
of the putrefying remnants that make up the northern and southern portions of 
what was once the world’s fourth largest inland body of water. The reason for 
relying on such gigantic scale cotton production, which incidentally is 
indigenous to the region, stemmed from two sources; the Soviet Command 
Economy and Sharaf Rashidov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party 
Central Committee from 1959 until his death in 19 8 3 35. Tsukatani candidly 
states that “the cotton monoculture was the creation of Rashidov himself’36. The 
reality is of course not that accurate, a number of factors, including Rashidov, as 
well as command economic planning, gross incompetence and corruption all 
contributed. The focus on raw cotton as a hard currency earner for the CARs has 
not changed since the fragmentation of the USSR, in particular for Uzbekistan, 
the fifth largest producer of cotton in the world' . It has become the necessary 
evil, too expensive to reform or significantly improve, without the injection of 
vast amounts of foreign capital, and yet still capable of providing an economic 
benefit to the economy, but at great expense to the environment, and the long­
term viability of the crop itself.
34 For a detailed account of the destruction of the Aral Sea see; Francheska Chalidze, “Aral Sea
Crisis: A Legacy of Soviet Rule” Central Asia Monitor, No.l, 1992 at
www.chalidze.com/cam/02,1,2.htm[02/12/2000].
35 Critchlow mentions that cotton had been an integral part of the Soviet economy since 1920 
when Lenin signed a decree calling for the revitalisation of cotton-growing on a ‘socialist’ basis. 
Critchlow, op. cit.. p.62. Cotton actually has been a staple export commodity of Central Asia 
since the days of the American Civil War which had cut off Russia’s primary source of raw 
cotton. Edward Allworth (ed.). Central Asia 120 Years o f Russian Rule (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1989). pp. 28-29. Jukes believes that the American Civil War led to a renewed 
Russian advance into cotton-growing areas. Geoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia, (Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson/Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), pp. 34-35.
36 Tsukatani, op. cit., p. 58.
37 ibid., p. 57.
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Whilst the destruction of the Aral Sea is by far the most telling example of cotton 
monoculture, the use of extremely potent pesticides and chemicals, in the main 
for the cotton crop, is another by-product. Tsukatani refers to a lengthy list of 
fertilisers, pesticides and defoliants, including, but not limited to DDT, BHC,
O
methyl mercaptophos, octamethyl, and butifos . Butifos in particular which was 
known to effect the central nervous system, heart, liver, kidneys, as well as 
immunological reactions, and which Uzbekistan used on 60 percent of its fields 
in 1985, was not banned by the USSR Ministry of public Health until 19 8 739. 
The resulting over-use of chemicals, Uzbekistan alone used over 300 kg per 
hectare in 1987, whereas the USSR average for the same year was 122 kg, has 
had a devastating effect. As a result of such over-use, the chemicals have 
filtered through to the groundwater layer. A capillary channel, a result of using 
large amounts of irrigation water, between the groundwater and the surface 
water, acts as means for the contaminated ground water to rise to the surface40. 
Once this occurs the water is either consumed by humans, or it evaporates 
leaving behind a toxic layer, which in turn is distributed even further through 
chemical laden dust storms. Quite simply, the demise of the Aral Sea has seen a 
dramatic increase in mortality rates, life expectancy has sharply fallen and 
disease, such as Tuberculosis, is rampant41.
A failure to change inadequate cultivation methods, embrace better technology, 
decrease dependence on abusive processes, and a complete disregard for the 
long-term effects on the environment and the surrounding population were all 
factors in this tragedy. Cotton was however too central to the CARs. It was, and 
still is, a very important hard currency commodity. However with the advent of 
the hydrocarbon industry, oil is fast becoming the hard currency commodity for 
the littoral states, especially Kazakstan and Azerbaijan.
38 ibid, p. 63.
39 ibid, p. 64.
40 ibjd, p. 63.
41 “Water Wars: Part II -  The Aral Sea”, BBC News cited at ww.caspianstudies.com/news/bbcOO- 
03.htm [16/06/2000],
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Emergence of a New Monoculture ?
There is the possibility for a similarly hypertrophic result stemming from the 
excessive reliance of various actors on energy exploitation and extraction, even 
though the region is no longer functioning in an integrated command economy. 
With the rush to exploit the energy reserves of the Caspian, the same process of 
pursuing short-term economic gains, if left to develop along the lines of the 
cotton monoculture, will have an impact that will out-weigh any possible 
advantages taken from exploiting the oil and gas reserves42. Should this be the 
case then the environment will once again suffer, unless clear and enforceable 
environmental safeguards are administered. To date there have been some 
positive signs43 but if the case of the Sturgeon, or the Caspian seal (phoca 
caspica), are taken as examples, then there is still a lot to be done to ensure that 
exploitative economic single-minded practices do not impact upon the Caspian 
Sea in such a negative capacity as was the case with the Aral Sea.
The Caspian Seal, the only mammal in the Caspian Sea, and only one of two 
freshwater seal species, has suffered a similar fate to the sturgeon44. In early 
June 2000, an estimated 11,000 seals were found dead, or dying, in Kazakstan 
and in Dagestan, most washed up around Aqtaü, bleeding from their noses, 
mouths and ears45. The cause of death -  most likely, but unproved; poisoning 
from sulfur gas, a deadly colloid by-product of oil extraction. The source of the 
contamination has reputedly been linked to Tengizchevroil (TCO) and the 
Offshore Kazakstan International Operating Company (OKIOC), but along with 
some Kazak officials, these companies have denied any sulfur discharges
42 See Dariaie, ibid.
42 The Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) has recently set up the Caspian 
Environmental Laboratory in order to monitor the effects of oil field development in the region. 
“Giving a green boost” News and Topics at www.statoil.com [05/03/99].
44 There is an estimated population of 400,000 seals in the Caspian Sea, of which 30,000 to 
40,000 are hunted annually, making this the second largest hunting ground for the seal globally. 
Namazi, op. cit., pp. 124 & 129.
45 Anna Badkhen, “Oil Rush may kill Caspian Ecosystem’, The Times o f Central Asia
Wednesday, 2 August, 2000, Volume 2, Issue 30 (73) as of July 27 at
www.times.kg/2000/N30/fea-02.shtml [02/08/2000].
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occurred46. The Kazak Environment Minister Serikbek Daukeyev has, however, 
openly stated that there is a link between the mass deaths of seals in the Caspian 
Sea to ‘oil wastes and pesticides’. Daukeyev said expert analyses had shown 
large amounts of pesticides and toxic oil wastes in the animals' bodies47. There 
have also been reports that TCO and OKIOC have exceeded, on several 
occasions, maximum permissible content limits for mercury and cadmium, which 
may have lead to the systematic poisoning of both sturgeon and seal. . Because 
there is no unified legal regime in force throughout the Caspian Sea it is very 
difficult to maintain common standards relating to exploration based pollution. 
In March 2000, the littoral states met in Kazakstan and agreed upon a draft 
environmental plan for the Caspian Sea, implementation, however, is dependent 
upon finalisation of the territorial disputes49.
In comparing the fate of the Aral Sea with that of the rising water level of the 
Caspian Sea, there is one striking difference; fluctuating water levels of the 
Caspian Sea are a natural occurrence. Most long-term environmental calamities 
are however, caused not by nature but rather, in the first instance, by mankind. 
Reliance on the cotton monoculture can easily be repeated with a reliance on 
energy reserves. Whilst the Caspian Sea is not shrinking, a number of significant 
problems associated with hydrocarbon exploration in the low-lying areas around 
the Caspian Sea are causing environmental concerns, such as those highlighted 
above. Increased reliance on energy reserves will not just affect the ecology of 
the Caspian Sea. The three emerging exporters; Kazakstan, Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan might also fall prey to Dutch disease, which in an agricultural 
economy will have devastating consequences. However, before the necessary 
expansion can effectively proceed, that may in turn lead to this economic 
problem, the issue of whether the Caspian Sea is a sea or a lake needs to be
46 ibid.
47 “Seals' Deaths Linked to Major Joint Venture”, The Oil Daily, June 8, 2000 at 
www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m3TOD/l 10_50/62595760/pl/article.jhtml [01/12/2000].
48 “Oil Companies Kill Kazakh Seals” The Times o f Central Asia Wednesday, 2 August, 2000, 
Volume 2, Issue 30 (73) as of July 27 at www.times.kg/2000/N30/fea-01.shtml [02/08/2000].
49 Daphne Biliouri, “Caspian Region Strives to Balance Offshore Oil Development With
Environmental Concerns” Eurasianet Environment August 21, 2000 at
www.eurasianet.org/departments/environment/articles/eav032000.shtml [21/08/2000].
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resolved to the satisfaction of all the littoral states. Resolution of this issue will 
result in stability within the region relating to exploration, and enable joint 
discussion on the environment, as well as the notion of a trans-Caspian sea 
pipeline. Unilateral decisions can then be made within an agreed framework 
regarding the legal position of actors involved, which is currently not possible.
The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea -  Does it really matter ?
Discussions that revolve around the Caspian Sea often make passing comment to 
a number of issues that are important to the long-term viability of the Caspian 
Sea as an economic, as well as an environmental zone. One of these is the 
environmental consequences of unbridled exploitation of the Caspian Sea’s key 
energy resources, which was discussed above, another is the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea. These two issues are often overlooked, or merely not 
comprehended to the extent deserved. This thesis posits that environmental and 
economic sustainability in the Caspian is dependent upon a successful resolution 
to the legal status of the ‘ownership’ of the Caspian Sea. The two issues are 
inter-twined because once an agreed decision has been reached on the legal status 
of the Caspian Sea, then adequate collective and individual responsibility for the 
Caspian Sea can be established. Until agreement is reached there is no real 
incentive for individual actors to combat environmental damage, and collective 
action is simply not possible.
Any discussion on the Caspian energy reserves must seek to address the complex 
issue regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea. It is required because a 
significant amount of exploration occurs in offshore waters that may be viewed, 
by other actors, as their sovereign territory. Ambiguity regarding the legal 
boundaries, will result, and already has, in tensions between the various actors 
involved, which may easily escalate with a change in leaders and/or perceptions 
of where boundaries should lie. This does not mean that resolution of the legal 
position of the Caspian Sea will negate the possibility of conflict. It will, 
however, provide a framework to promote stability and enable clear guidance 
concerning current and future investment in the region, something that is clearly
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lacking at the present moment. Until the issue is resolved stability will not be 
forthcoming.
The Issue
The issue is quite simple: is the Caspian Sea a sea, or is it a lake. It might be 
argued that the debate itself is disputable, because the Caspian Sea is already 
referred to as a ‘sea’. However, as Oxman mentions, the use of ‘proper names in 
geography is not the result of scientific, legal or political classification, most 
proper names defer to custom’50. Oxman continues by suggesting that ‘The fact 
that the proper name uses the word ‘sea’ says little about either its scientific or it 
normative classification’51. The legal conjecture is nevertheless real and 
substantial. Whether or not the Caspian Sea is a sea, a lake, or a unique 
international body of water, will have a direct bearing on energy reserve 
exploration and exploitation.
The substantive question however, regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea 
is not about the sea itself, but rather about what is under the sea, namely the 
seabed and subsoil resources. It is from this that the current debate stems, 
because once a unified legal regime is adopted, or is proven, it will have an 
almost immediate impact on the ability of actors to exploit the energy reserves. 
If the Caspian Sea is a sea, then each littoral state has certain rights under the 
1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, which came into effect on 16 
November 1994. These rights include a twelve nautical mile zone of sovereign 
territorial sea and a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) . If it is a lake, 
then each state maintains a nominal exclusion zone, but the centre of the lake is 
collectively owned, and the resources are equally shared.
30 Oxman, Bernard H, “Caspian Sea or Lake: What Difference Does It Make ?”, Caspian 
Crossroads Magazine, Volume 1, Number 4 (Winter 1996). At
www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/casp.htm [28/12/98],
51 ibid.
52 Cynthia Croissant and Michael Croissant, “The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea; Conflict and 
Compromise”, in Michael Croissant and Bülent Aras, (eds.). Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian 
Sea Region, (Westport: Praeger, 1999). p. 25
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Before the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, issues such as the ownership of the 
Caspian Sea, or more correctly, right of access to the Caspian Sea, were much 
simpler. With the end of the cold war the situation has fundamentally changed 
and taken on a more complex dimension. Before 1991, the Caspian Sea was 
divided between two states, the Soviet Union and Iran. Now it is bordered by 
five independent states, and each is laying claim to what each perceives as their 
exclusive sovereign territory, with no regard to fact that there is no agreement 
concerning the legal status of the Caspian Sea. To understand the current 
geopolitical situation a knowledge of the legal regime that existed before 1991 is 
instrumental.
The ‘Soviet-lranian’ Sea
Prior to 1991 there were two primary binding treaties between Moscow and 
Tehran concerning the Caspian Sea, although there have been many other treaties 
between the two for several centuries53. The Soviet-Persian Treaty (26 February 
1921), established freedom of navigation for both Soviet and Persian ships on the 
Caspian Sea. In two previous treaties, 1813 and 1828, there were restrictions on 
Persian maritime traffic. The second treaty, the Treaty on Trade and Navigation 
between the USSR and Iran (25 March 1940), echoed the 1921 treaty regarding 
maritime traffic and also included a ten mile offshore fishing zone54. What these 
treaties failed to do however, was actually define the issue of territorial 
sovereignty, the primary cause of dispute in the current debate. The treaties were 
more concerned with access, in particular limiting third party access. The 
Caspian Sea was, for practical and legal purposes, a jointly shared international 
body of water between these two countries. The real effect of these treaties was 
to intimate that the Caspian Sea was a condominium55.
53 Mirfendereski cites nine treaties; 1725, 1732, 1813, 1828, 1881, 1893, 1921, 1954 and 1957
and one undisclosed memorandum in 1962. Guive Mirfendereski, “Lost at Sea”, The Iranian, 
(October 29 1998) at www.iranian.com/GuiveMirfendereski/Oct98/Caspian/index.html
[06/01/2000].
54 Croissant and Croissant, op. cit.. p. 23.
55 Condominium is sovereign control over a dependent territory by two or more states. It is a 
comparatively rare form of legal and political control. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, 
Dictionary o f International Relations, (London: Penguin Books, 1998). p. 92.
48
In 1991, after the fragmentation of the Union, the Alma-Ata Declaration, which 
established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), ‘committed the 
former Soviet States to honour all international treaties signed by the USSR’̂ 6. 
Thus the treaties are, in a juridical sense, still legally binding. As Croissant and 
Croissant mention, ‘Since these treaties were never formally rescinded, Russia 
insists that they are still applicable57. To suggest that the demise of the Soviet 
Union rendered these treaties, but not others null and void, is plainly illogical and 
incorrect. Legally, if the treaties that contained the Soviet Union as a signatory 
were to be classed as invalid, than all treaties, including the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, which a number of littoral actors have been promoting would also 
be abrogated. Clearly, seeking to use a formal argument such as this does not 
hold.
Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas
The Soviet attitude, based on the notion of the Caspian Sea being a closed sea, 
was to exclude any third party from attempting to access the Caspian Sea, either 
via the Volga/Don river and canal systems, or other means, such as when English
C O
forces attempted to take control of Baku after the First World WaL . Churchill is 
reported to have said that ‘allied control of the former Russian Empire cannot be 
reliable if the northern Caucasus and the Caspian area are not under the control 
of the western powers’59. The Soviets viewed the Caspian Sea as a ‘closed sea’, 
a concept they tried to extend to the Black Sea60. A brief mention of the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Convention, in particular Article 122, ‘Enclosed or Semi- 
Enclosed Seas’, is required at this point.
56 Galia Golan, Russian and Iran A Strategic Partnership ? (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1998). p. 14.
37 Croissant and Croissant, loc. cit.
3S Hassanov, loc. cit. and Maxwell, loc. cit.
59 Cited in Yagmur Kochumov, “Issues of International Law and Politics in the Caspian in the 
Context of Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan Discussion and Fuel Transportation”, Caspian Crossroads 
Magazine, Volume 4, Number 2, (Winter 1999), At 
www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/422.htm [28/12/98].
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Article 122.
For the purposes of this Convention, "enclosed or semi-enclosed sea" 
means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and 
connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or 
consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive 
economic zones of two or more coastal States61.
The general principle of the Law of the Sea is that it applies to the seas and 
oceans of the world. This is extended to oceans or seas that are either ‘enclosed 
or semi-enclosed’ that may be connected by a ‘narrow outlet’. It is fair to say 
that the Volga and the Don river systems are not ‘narrow outlets’. Logic like this 
would allow Lake Victoria in Africa, as well as other inland lakes being classed 
as ‘enclosed seas’. Clagett makes another valid point relating to the discussion 
regarding the Law of the Sea: ‘The reason why the law of the sea is not
applicable to inland seas in its entirety, is freedom of navigation, which is a 
cardinal principle of the law of the sea’ . If this view is taken, then the Caspian 
Sea cannot be a sea, enclosed or otherwise; it is a lake. The problem is that if the 
Caspian Sea is a ‘lake’ it would provide considerable support to the 1921 and 
1940 treaties. Should these treaties be accepted as binding then unilateral 
decisions could be overturned in multi-party discussions. However acceptance 
of these treaties from Kazakstan and Azerbaijan is not forthcoming. If this 
position is taken, it leaves the door open for a number of propositions as to what 
the Caspian Sea should be and these proposals are constructed by looking 
through the dual prism of geopolitical and geostrategic objectives.
60 Amineh, op. cit.. p. 145.
61 Law of the Sea Convention cited at www.tuffs.edu/departments/fletcher/mulit/sea.html 
[11/12/99],
62 Brice M. Clagett, “Ownership of Seabed and Subsoil Resources in the Caspian Sea Under the 
Rules of International Law”, Caspian Crossroads Magazine, Volume 1, Number 3, 
(Summer/Fall 1995), at www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/casp.htm [28/12/98],
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Current Proposals
There are several conflicting proposals for dividing the Caspian Sea. Essentially, 
there are two opposing views, along with the ever oscillating ‘neutral’ 
Turkmenistan. Supporting the notion of common ownership have been the 
Iranians and the Russians, and occasionally Turkmenistan, whilst the Kazaks and 
Azeris have been advocating sectoral division of both the Sea and the subsoil. In 
all truthfulness, however, all the parties except the Azeris have changed the 
positions or modified them during the last few years, which has contributed to 
the current state of confusion.
In 1996, Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan signed a declaration supporting joint
z
ownership and equal sharing of resources . However in April 1998, Russia and 
Azerbaijan agreed to divide the seabed adjacent to their coasts into national 
sectors, and two months later Russia and Kazakstan agreed to do the same64. 
Two years earlier, Russia was proposing a 72 kilometre zone of national 
jurisdiction65. In response to this change, both Iran and Turkmenistan rejected 
this new approach as, according to them, it violates an agreement reached in 
Turkmenistan that any change to the legal regime must be agreed unanimously66.
Russia has also proposed dividing the seabed and subsoil into national sectors, 
but having the actual sea as an international body of water. In support of this 
proposal, Feliks Kovalev, Ambassador-at-Large for the Russian Federation, said 
that if the Caspian Sea was to be divided into national sectors each ‘owner’ of the 
respective sector ‘will at his own discretion adopt specific norms, and either 
observe or not observe them. The risk of ecological disasters would be increased 
many times over’ . In response to this split apportionment, the Iranian foreign
63 Mirfendereski, loc. cit.
64 ibid.
65 Lena Jonson, Russia and Central Asia: A New Web o f Relations, (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1998). p. 71.
66 Iran Weekly Press Digest 1998, July 4-10, Volume 11, Number 28 cited in Amineh, op. cit., p. 
153.
67 Feliks Kovalev, “Caspian Oil: Russian Interests” International Affairs, Volume 43, Number 3 
(1997), p. 49.
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minister Kamal Kharrazi rejected the proposal. ‘If there is going to be a division 
accepted by different countries, I’m sure that one legal regime has to be applied 
to the sea bed, as well as the waters of the Caspian Sea’ . Quick to downplay 
this Boris Pastukhov, the First Deputy Foreign Minister, reaffirmed Russia’s 
commitment to the 1921 and 1940 treaties with Iran shortly after this new 
approach was announced69. As with other proposals the latest Russian one 
actually has yet to be accepted by all the players. The US view on the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea is simple. James Collins, the Special Ambassador to 
the New Independent States, said, in a 1996 letter to Aliyev, President of 
Azerbaijan, that Washington ‘supports our investment companies and upholds 
the idea of sectoral division of the Caspian Sea’70.
Recent disputes
Concern regarding the unresolved nature of the Caspian Sea did not seem to 
effect energy reserve exploration, when foreign firms (including Russia’s 
LUKoil), signed an agreement on 20 September 1994, with Azerbaijan and the 
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) to explore the offshore oil fields of 
Azerbaijan71. However, in a letter sent to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations on 5 October, 1994, the Russian Federation delivered a strongly worded 
threat to those involved, or seeking to be, in energy exploration without Russia’s 
consent and participation. In part the letter said:
Unilateral actions in the Caspian Sea are unlawful and will not be 
recognised by the Russian federation, which reserves the right to take 
necessary steps at any time that it considers appropriate in order to
68 Cited in Elaine Sciolino, “It’s a Sea, It’s a Lake ! No. It’s a Pool of Oil !”, New York Times on 
the Web (June 21 1998) at www.nytimes.com [17/02/99],
69 Croissant and Croissant, op. cit., p. 35.
70 ibid., p. 33.
71 Pavel Baev, Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1997). p. 32.
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restore law and order and liquidate the consequences of unilateral 
actions72.
It would seem that LUKoil's involvement, and the attendance of a representative 
from the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy, failed to convince the Russian 
Foreign Ministry that Russia was involved . Ominous as the threat sounded, 
copies of which were also delivered to the states of those firms involved, to date 
there has been no signs of flotilla sailing down the Caspian Sea to ‘liquidate the 
consequences’. Earlier that year (1994) the Russian Foreign Ministry informed 
the English government of Russia’s right to coordinate all energy development in 
the Caspian Sea. London was targeted because of the primary role that BP was 
perceived to be playing in Azerbaijan14.
It needs to be pointed out that because of what Jonson calls ‘a lack of policy 
coordination’ different ministries from Moscow have either supported, or acted 
against, the official government line regarding the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea, at the same time75. A salient example of this is occurred in 1993 when Yuri 
Shaffanik, Russian Fuel and Energy Minister, signed an agreement with 
Azerbaijan that actually ‘recognised an Azerbaijani sector in the Caspian Sea’76. 
Disputes specifically related to the Caspian Sea’s legal status have however been 
few, albeit significant. There have been two recent disputes worth commenting 
on which occurred as a specific result of the unresolved nature of the Caspian 
Sea status and relate directly to exploration of Caspian energy reserves.
In mid 1997, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and two Russian oil 
companies - LUKoil and Rosneft - agreed to develop the disputed Kyapaz/Serdar
72 Oumerserik Kasenov, “Russia, Transcaucasia and Central Asia: Oil, Pipelines, and 
Geopolitics”, in Roald Z. Sagadeev and Susan Eisenhower (eds.). Central Asia Conflict 
Resolution and Change, (Chevy Chase: CPSS Press, 1995). p. 69.
72 Baev, loc. cit.
4 Robert V. Barylski, “Russia, the West, and the Caspian Energy Hub ”, The Middle East 
Journal Volume 49, Number 2, (Spring, 1995). pp. 223.
75 Jonson, op. cit.. p. 69.
76 Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics o f Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). p. 29.
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field, which is essentially in the middle of the Absheron sill77. This is a field that 
Turkmenistan claims as its own, and refers to it as Serdar. Initially, Russia 
appeared indifferent, but towards the end of July a Russian delegation went to 
Turkmenistan to apologise, but to also justify its position. Turkmenistan 
threatened the Russian Federation with international legal action and insisted that 
‘no more oil agreements should be signed with Baku until the question of the 
Caspian Sea’s status is settled definitively’ . Eventually Russia capitulated and 
‘persuaded’ the Russian oil companies to withdraw from the disputed contract. 
A reason given was that the contract had been signed ‘behind the back of the 
foreign ministry’79. A week later Turkmenistan issued a call for tenders to
O A
prospect and extract oil and gas in the Turkmen ‘sector’ of the Caspian sea .
The second incident was between Russia and Kazakstan. In August 1997, the 
Russian Ministry of Natural Resources announced a closed tender (available only 
to Russian firms) for a section in the north east of the Caspian Sea, near the 
Kazak-Russian border. The field, called Severny in Russian, and Kurmamgazy 
in Kazak, is believed to hold in the vicinity of 150-600 million tons of 
recoverable oil, also happens to overlap with a section that Kazakstan considers 
its very own. The area of the Severny license area is 8,500 square kilometres. A 
spokesman for the Russian foreign ministry mentioned that the successful 
tenderer would have to adhere to ‘adjustments to sector boundaries’81. Shortly 
thereafter, on December 10, LUKoil was named the winner of the tender. Kazak 
protests were initially dismissed as groundless, with Russia stating the ‘obvious’ 
that ‘there have never been any borders in the Caspian Sea legalised via 
treaties’82.
77 Jonson, op. cit.. p. 70.
78 Croissant and Croissant, op. cit.. p. 34.
79 Jonson, op. cit.. p. 71.
80 ibid.
81 Mikhail Alexandrov, “Russian-Kazakh Contradictions on The Caspian Legal Status”, Russian 
and Euro-Asian Bulletin, Volume 7, Number 2, (February 1998), p. 10.
82 ibid.
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During the conflict over the tender, LUKoil's president Vagit Alexperov, offered 
to upgrade an oilfield, increase LUKoil’s share in TCO from 5 to 10 percent, as 
well as reminding Nazarbayev that LUKoil had already invested 300 million
O ')
dollars into Kazakstan and the investment could reach 740 million . However in 
a surprise move, the Russian Prosecutor General protested the tender results on 
ecological grounds, as the region had previously been declared a ‘natural reserve 
and a breeding ground for fish by the government of the then Russian Soviet 
Federated Socialist Republic’84. LUKoil accepted the decision. The most logical 
reason why LUKoil acquiesced so easily is that Russia still wants Kazak oil to 
flow through Russian territory all the way to Novorossiysk, pushing the point 
about who controlled what, may have encouraged the Kazak government to 
consider alternative routes for its oil, thereby decreasing the amount of influence 
Russia would have over Kazakstan. Nevertheless in spite of this, Kazakstan has 
begun to explore in this region, and the legality of their actions are not 
questioned85. In a recent press release LUKoil announced that it would begin 
exploration in the Severny license area ‘as a result of the tender held in 
December 1997’86.
What is to be done ?
Bernard Oxman makes a sobering point regarding the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea.
Attempting to determine the rights and duties of the states concerned 
by a process of deductive reasoning based on the status of the Caspian 
Sea as a sea or a lake is largely, if not entirely, a pointless endeavour.
Vladimir Babek, “Kazakstan: Big Politics Around Big Oil” in Michael Croissant and Biilent 
Aras (eds.). Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region (Westport: Praeger, 1999). p. 191.
84 ibid.
83 In fact, in 1994/95, the Soviet Government decreed that the entire region in the Caspian Sea 
above the 44th parallel was to be set aside as a ground for the reproduction of rare fish and all 
human activity, except sailing and fishing, was banned, ibid., p. 192.
86 “LUKoil launched drilling of the second exploratory well at the Severny license area in the 
Caspian” Press Release (2 June, 2000) via LUKoil email list.
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The true answer to the question of whether it is a lake or a sea is the
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eternal answer of the thoughtful lawyer: “that depends” .
What depends in the Caspian Sea is not whether it is a sea, a lake or an 
international body of water, but rather the geopolitical and geostrategic outcomes 
the various actors are seeking. This thesis concurs with conventional wisdom 
regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea. It is a unique body of water and 
should be treated accordingly. It is not a sea, in the strict legal sense, but 
nevertheless has many qualities of an enclosed or semi enclosed basin, being 
surrounded by several states that all have common interest in the resources 
contained within. Nor is it a lake in the traditional sense either, which is an 
important factor to consider. What is required in the Caspian is not so much a 
compromise between the supporters of the Law of the Sea or the Condominium, 
but rather a solution pertinent to the current and future needs of the region.
Accordingly, the thesis supports the view of the Russian Federation that 
ownership of the Seabed and the Subsoil should be divided according to the 
equidistance boundaries from the shoreline of each state, but the water itself 
should fall under the notion of common ownership. Dividing the Caspian Sea in 
this way will resolve a number of outstanding issues. This will also allow 
freedom of navigation on the Caspian Sea which would reduce the possibility of 
confrontation over boundaries by surface vessels. This division allows each 
political actor to exercise total sovereignty over their respective seabed territory 
ensuring that exploitation of reserves is still possible. The controversial issue of 
a trans-Caspian pipeline must then be approved by all parties, which at this stage 
would be highly unlikely. The proposed trans-Caspian pipeline runs above the 
sea-bed which means that all parties are involved in its route, capacity and 
direction. The joint ecological support that will result from this common 
ownership, would see the entire Caspian Sea becoming the responsibility of all 
states. This may well result in the formation of a Caspian Environmental 
Protection Authority to enforce environmentally friendly use of the Caspian’s 
resources.
87 Oxman, op. cit.
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In the meantime, however, a resolution to the Caspian Sea’s legal status has been 
delayed and hampered by actors who seek to exploit the region’s considerable 
energy reserves. It is highly probable that resolution to the legal status, and new 
treaties reinforcing this position, of the Caspian Sea, would have already been 
concluded, if the energy reserves were not extractable. However, because 
geopolitical machinations are so prevalent within the Caspian, the outcome of 
any Caspian Sea treaty will naturally reflect on the aspirations of the many actors 
involved. The reason for these actions revolves around the importance of oil as 
an export commodity and as a valuable bargaining tool in inter-actor 
negotiations. The importance of oil to the region needs to be discussed in order 
to facilitate the identification of geopolitical and geostrategic implications of 
energy reserve extraction and exploitation in the Caspian basin.
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Chapter Three
The Central Importance of Oil
An examination of the history of oil exploration and its exploitative powers is 
called for in order to understand the significance of the hydrocarbon reserves of 
the Caspian basin to both the regional and global oil industry. This will be 
achieved, in part, by referring to the primary developments in the American oil 
industry and the expansion in world trade in oil, and its derivatives, precipitated 
by the Caspian’s own evolution. The initial development of the Caspian basin, 
in particular, the oil fields around Baku, led to a number of advancements in 
upstream, midstream and downstream activities'. These developments were a 
result of both forward lateral thinking and fortuitous circumstances. Therefore 
an historical overview of the region is obligatory, covering aspects such as the 
growth and subsequent decline of the Caspian region in both Russian and Soviet 
periods. This sequential overview is required to highlight the advances, and the 
setbacks, which occurred during these two periods. An appreciation of the 
historical significance of the Caspian will enable a more robust discussion 
regarding the current issues surrounding its energy reserves. This approach will 
provide the means for a clearer understanding of the geopolitical nature of 
Caspian energy reserves and its implications upon regional stability, or 
instability.
There were a number of obstacles that impeded development in the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century which also continued into the Soviet period. These obstacles 
have again resurfaced to hinder, and to challenge, contemporary endeavours in 
exploration and exploitation of Caspian basin energy reserves. Obstacles such as 
monopoly control on pipeline routes, topographical hindrances in the quest to 
transport oil, the need for substantial foreign investment in upstream, midstream 
and downstream activities and praetorian, heavy-handed, and inept local 
administrations. It is indeed ironic that little has changed in the Caspian region;
1 The full cycle of commercial utilisation of oil can be divided into three streams. Upstream 
(exploration and production), Midstream (tankers and pipelines) and Down Stream (refining 
marketing and distribution).
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that these issues have resurfaced is proof of the difficulties involved in Caspian 
energy development. Difficulties that have been effectively exploited by the 
various actors involved, often to the detriment of the local populace that are very 
much dependent upon the success of the divers ventures that seek to harness the 
Caspian’s potential.
The History of Oil in the Caspian basin
With the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Basin is again set to 
become a significant, player in the geopolitics of energy. As a result of the 
isolation of the region during the Soviet period, and with the overwhelming 
importance attached to the Persian Gulf as far as world energy needs are 
concerned, it is often forgotten that the modem oil industry actually began on the 
shores of the Caspian Sea, particularly in and around Baku, located on the 
Absheron peninsula. The Absheron peninsula flows into what is known as the 
Absheron Sill, an underwater ridge that extends across the width of the Caspian 
to Turkmenistan". The Sill contains many large oil deposits, as well as a number 
of sizeable gas deposits, and separates the deeper southern Caspian Sea basin 
from the more shallow waters in the north.
The Caspian is a region of the world that has a very long history related to the 
use of hydrocarbons such as oil and gas2 3. Zoroaster4, the founder of the belief 
system that later bore his name, is reputed to have visited Baku itself5, and this 
may give credence to the notion that the ‘eternal fires’ of Baku provided an
2 Cynthia Croissant, Azerbaijan, Oil and Geopolitics, (Comack: Nova Science Publishers Inc, 
1998). p. 20.
3 Other regions include Sumatra, Burma and the historical Hit, on the Euphrates River in ancient 
Mesopotamia.
4 Zoroaster is the anglicised form of Zarathushtra; the former is the more correct spelling. There 
is no agreement on the actual period when the prophet Zarathustra lived, with estimates ranging 
from 700 BC to 1400 BC. All that is known is that he was bom in Persia, and the belief system 
he instituted contains many themes that are found in other later belief systems such as Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam. There are 3 main communities of Zoroastrians numbering a few hundred 
thousand; two in Iran, (Tehran and Yazd), and one in India (Bombay) where they are referred to 
as Parsees (Persians).
5 John McLaurin, cited in Bülent Gökay, “History of Oil Development in the Caspian Basin”, in 
Michael Croissant and Bülent Aras (eds.), Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region 
(Westport: Praeger, 1999). p. 3.
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impetus for the use of fire temples in Zoroastrian belief, including the temple of 
Surakhani on the Absheron peninsula fuelled by natural gas6. Early stories, such 
as these, are difficult to verify. There are, however, more recent accounts from 
travellers such as Marco Polo (1271), Giosafat Barbara (1543), John Cartwright 
(1600) and Englebert Kampfer (1684), that substantiate the claims that the 
natural seepage of petroleum products was utilised by the region’s inhabitants, as 
well as traded7 8. It was in the latter part of the nineteenth century that the 
exploitation of these reserves was to increase substantially, and this coincided 
with the exploration for oil on the other side of the Atlantic, primarily in the US 
state of Pennsylvania. It is ironic that the evolution, and subsequent competition, 
of the oil industries in these two nations (America and Russia), separated by such 
vast distances, would impact on each other’s development. Even more so, that 
this development in turn would envelop the rest of the world as it was drawn into 
a bi-polar construct called the cold war.
Kerosene & Pennsylvania
As the industrial revolution progressed in Europe and America, the needs of the 
factories for a lubricant to combat the incessant friction of machinery was 
growing. Rising in importance was also the need for another source of 
illumination, which was at that stage primarily supplied through oil from sperm 
whales. These needs resulted in the development of a new product, which was a
o
derivative of asphalt; kerosene . There were a number of problems with 
kerosene, not the least being that there was no real suitable source of supply, nor 
an extraction method useful in the collection of either asphalt, or crude oil. Some 
of this supply came from Pennsylvania rock oil, but on a Saturday in August 
1859, this was to change. On this day oil was found, not by digging by hand, or 
by skimming of the top of shallow pools, but by mechanical drilling9. A method
6 Firouzeh Mostashari, “Development of Caspian Oil in Historical Perspective” in Hoosang 
Amirahmadi, (ed.). The Caspian Region at a Crossroad (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 
p. 89.
7 Gökay op. cit.. pp. 3-6.
8 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, (New York: 
Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, 1992). p. 23.
9 ibid., p. 27.
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of discovery, and recovery, was subsequently developed that would usher in the 
development of a steady source of supply, for industry and consumer alike. In a 
few short years, by 1862, American kerosene had even reached St. Petersburg in 
Tsarist Russia10. Kerosene had become by the 1870s and 1880s, according to 
Yergin, the fourth-largest export in value, as well as accounting for over half of 
American oil output, with Europe being the largest market1'. While these events 
were occurring in Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, the Baku region on the west 
coast of the Caspian Sea, was undergoing a slow transformation.
The Rise of Baku & State Control
In 1813, Tsarist Russia again reconquered the region around Baku, after another 
war with Persia which subsequently resulted in the Treaty of Gulistan. This 
treaty confirmed Russia’s possession of east and west Georgia and Dagestan, as 
well as the smaller Khanates of Baku, Shirvan, Gyandzha and Karabakh . As a 
result of this treaty, all warships were banned from the Caspian, except Russian. 
Therefore the region, had been an object of struggle between Persian and Russian 
states for several centuries. Although there were to be a number of conflicts 
between Russia and Persia after 1813, the former’s supremacy in the Caspian 
was not seriously challenged. In due course, the Tsars laid foundations of a state 
organised oil industry and, with the appointment of the first Russian viceroy of 
the Caucasus, Prince Mikhail S. Vorontsov, in 1845, the ‘direction-less affair’ 
that was Russia’s early administration over the Caucasus was over 13. It was the 
events on the other side of the Atlantic however, with the supply of American 
kerosene to Moscow, that would lead to the reorganisation of the state run 
monopoly, which in turn propelled the Caspian region, and in particular Baku, 
into occupying the centre stage of world oil supply by 1900.
10 ibid., p. 57.
" ibid., p. 56.
12 Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride o f Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder, 
(London: Zed Books, 1994). p. 19.
13 ibid, p. 22.
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In 1737, there were 53 hand-dug wells on the site of the present day Balakhany 
field, and by 1829, Alexander Von Humboldt reported that there were 82 such 
wells14. On the other side of the Caspian, by 1838, there may have been as many 
as 3,500 pits and seepage locations15. The Russian viceroy of the Caucasus, 
Vorontsov, reported in 1847, that oil was found at a well drilled at Bibi-Eibat 
immediately south of Baku. According to the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences, 
the first well was drilled in 1848; however, mechanical drilling did not arrive 
until 1871, when the appropriate technology was imported16. The reliance on 
imported technology was to become a consistent theme in the Caspian basin. 
Russian technology relied on wooden, not metal tools, which made it difficult to 
go beyond 300 feet17. Nevertheless, production steadily rose, from 41,000 
barrels18 in 1863 to 204,000 in 1870. This five-fold increase in production came 
from the Baku fields alone19.
The Russian government between 1813 and 1871, used several different systems 
in managing the Baku oil fields. The first stage, from 1813 to 1825, saw the 
government lease the land to contractors, then from 1825 to 1849, the Russian 
government chose to operate the field on its own, but again reverted to the 
contractor arrangement until 1871. Perhaps the most telling indictment of the 
short-sightedness of the administration was that the lease was only for four years 
in which time the lessee had to dig his wells (by hand) and make a profit . In 
1872 the government finally agreed to auction leases publicly. This new 
approach coincided with the recent arrival of mechanical drilling equipment. A 
year later Robert Nobel, a Russian citizen of Swedish extraction bought a small
14 Cited in Edgar Wesley Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders: A History o f Exploration for Petroleum, 
(Tulsa: The American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1975). p. 3.
15 ibid.
16 ibid., p. 4.
17 Marshall I. Goldman, The Enigma o f Soviet Petroleum (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1980). p. 19.
18 A Barrel of oil, as a unit of measure, equals 42 US gallons/35 Imperial gallons, or about 160 
litres. The size was the same proclaimed in 1482 by Edward IV as the standard size for packing 
and selling herring from the North Sea. Yergin, op. cit., p. 796.
19 Gökay, op. cit., p. 7.
2(1 Owen, op. cit.. p. 1355.
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refinery21, and by 1876 had sent his first shipment of illuminating oil to St. 
Petersburg22. Along with his brother Ludwig, the Nobels are justifiably credited 
with ‘bringing the Russian oil industry to world prominence’ .
The Obstacle of Transportation
The arrival of the Nobels, and foreign capital, did not transform the Caspian oil 
industry overnight. There was one factor that continued to impede the growth of 
the Caspian oil industry, aside from what Yergin calls the ‘corrupt, heavy- 
handed, and incompetent Tsarist administration’24. That factor was the same 
issue that is affecting current attempts to export Caspian energy reserves; 
namely, the difficulties associated with transportation. The topography of the 
Caspian region made it extremely difficult then, as it does now, to transport 
goods. This, combined with unfavourable weather conditions during the winter 
months, made the task of delivering crude oil to markets, whether inside the 
empire, or to Europe, almost impossible. The northern section of the Caspian 
Sea is very shallow, six metres on average, and freezes over to the point of 
having pack ice covering it by January '. As Yergin mentions, ‘Even parts of the 
[Tsarist] empire were inaccessible; in the city of Tiflis, it was cheaper to import 
kerosene from America, 8,000 miles away than from Baku, 341 miles to the 
west’ . In order to achieve a level of profitability, and to undercut the American 
product, the process of transporting Caspian kerosene, and later crude oil, by
21 He was sent originally to search the region in order to obtain a steady supply of Russian walnut 
in response to a large rifle contract with the Tsarist empire that the Nobel family had secured.
22 Yergin, op. cit.. p. 58.
22 Owen, loc. cit. For a more in-depth account of the impact that the Nobels had on the oil 
industry see; Robert W. Toft, The Russian Rockefellers The Saga o f the Nobel Family and the 
Russian Oil Industry) (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976).
24 Yergin, loc. cit.
25 Levent Hekimoglu, “Caspian Oil and the Environment: Curse or Cure ?”, in Michael Croissant 
and Bülent Aras (eds.). Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, (Westport: Praeger, 
1999). p. 84.
26 ibid, p. 60.
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sheer economic necessity had to be improved. The novel solution that Ludwig
27Nobel introduced, quite simply revolutionised the oil industry .
Tankers and Pipelines
The idea was simple: instead of shipping the oil in individual wooden barrels, 
which were already prohibitively expensive, and then transferring them onto 
barges at Astrakhan, at the mouth of the Volga in the north of the Caspian Sea, 
the Nobels developed the technique of shipping oil in bulk - thus the oil tanker 
was bom. In 1877, the Zoroaster, the world’s first bulk oil tanker, was put into 
service on the Caspian Sea . By the mid-1880s, the concept of transporting in 
bulk was being used also to service the Atlantic Sea route. In time the use of 
bulk carriers became common-place. What started out as a local improvement in 
the Caspian industry, that Ludwig Nobel freely offered to the oil industry, 
became an avenue for Marcus Samuel to use, in 1892, to undermine the then 
world leader Standard oil. The voyage of Samuel’s own tanker, the Murex, from 
England to Batum (Batumi) then onward through the Suez canaL to Singapore 
and Bangkok was the first use of a bulk carrier outside the Caspian. In 1895, a 
total of 69 tanker passages had been made through the Suez Canal and all, but 
four, were owned or chartered by Samuel, and in 1902, 90 percent of tankers that 
were to pass through the Suez canal belonged to Samuel . The importance that 
bulk transportation has had on the economy of the world cannot be emphasised 
enough. In 1989, oil tankers accounted for 38.4 percent of world shipping, 
carrying 37 percent of all seaborne cargoes31. This translated, in 1995, to almost 
900 million tonnes of crude oil and 205 million for petroleum products, of which 
an estimated 325 million went to the US and Canada, 220 million to Japan and
27 Goulishambarov is reputed to have said that “The successful solution of this difficult problem 
was entirely Ludwig Nobel.” cited in Toft, ibid., p. 54.
2S Gökay, op. cit.. p. 9.
29 Opened in 1869 the Suez Canal cut an estimated 4,000 miles of the journey to South-East Asia 
from Western Europe.
30 Yergin, op. cit.. p. 70.
31 Philip’s Encyclopaedic Atlas (2nd Edition) (London: George Philip, 1993). p. 29.
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325 million to Europe32. Shipping, in particular oil tankers, is now vital to the 
world economy.
This advancement in transportation through the use of bulk tankers, enabled the 
Nobels to dominate the delivery route through the Volga and Don. This naturally 
did not suit all of the producers who did not, or could not, afford to go the path of 
using bulk carriers, therefore another route needed to be developed. The only 
option was to go overland, to the Black Sea - no mean feat given the rugged and 
difficult terrain. Government approval was given to other producers to build a 
railroad from Baku to the Black Sea. However, because of a sudden drop in oil 
prices, the original backers of this project ran out of money, which allowed 
another European family to enter the Caspian oil industry - the Rothschilds. In 
1883, the railroad from Baku to the Black Sea port of Batumi was completed . 
Exports from Batumi were 3,300 tons in 188234, this figure reached 24,500 tons 
the following year, and 65,000 tons in 18 8 435. The railroad to the port of Batumi 
allowed Caspian oil to be exported to the West, and by 1892, East Asia36. By 
1897, Russian oil exports to Asia accounted for 38 percent of its exports, 
compared to 16 percent for the Americans .
Another achievement, although not unique to the Caspian, was the building of 
pipelines, a factor that features prominently in the current discussion on Caspian
•> o
energy reserves . Robert and Ludwig Nobel, with the aid of 400 tons of 
dynamite supplied by their brother Alfred, built a pipeline to overcome a
32 Eric Grove, “The Security of Shipping: The Global Perspective” in Sam Bateman and Stephen 
Bates, (eds.). “Shipping and Regional Security” Canberra Papers on Defence and Strategy> 
(Canberra; Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1998). p.2.
33 Yergin op. cit.. p. 61.
34 Along with the use of barrels per day (bpd), the metric ton is also used (predominantly in 
Europe) as a production measurement. One metric ton equates to approximately 7.3 barrels 
(1,185 litres). One barrel is about 160 litres.
35 Goldman, op. cit.. p. 17.
36 Yergin, op. cit.. pp. 65-70.
37 Goldman, loc. cit.
38 The first use of pipelines, which were wooden, is reported in 1866. Yergin, op. cit.. p. 33.
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bottleneck in the Baku-Batumi railroad. This bottleneck was in the form of a 
3,000-foot high peak within the Caucasus mountain range39. Great as the 
railroad was, only a limited number of box cars filled with oil could be taken 
over this peak in the range at any one time. In 1889, as the Nobels completed the 
42-mile pipeline, they encountered another problem; finding new markets for an 
ever-increasing quantity of oil. Fortunately the advent of the internal combustion 
engine was just around the comer. Important as the external market might have 
been, exorbitant taxes, 1,000 percent on pipeline shipments, and 1,200 percent on 
rail carriage, severely inhibited the exports of Caspian products. Nevertheless, 
between 1900-1913, an average of twelve percent of the crude produced, 
(approximately 10 million barrels) per year was exported this way40. The 
pipeline between Baku to Batumi, built in 1905 by the Rothschilds, also 
contributed to enhancing the limited export potential of Caspian oil41.
Growing Importance of the Caspian
The impact of pioneers, such as the Nobels, Rothschilds, Samuels and others, 
whilst very important often diminishes the significant role that leading Russian 
officials and entrepreneurs contributed to the early exploration and exploitation 
of Caspian oil. Individuals such as Kokorev and Gubonin, who built the first 
factory for manufacturing paraffin, and later kerosene, near Baku in 1859, 
Malikov, who constructed the first distillation machine in 1863, and government 
officials like Mendeleyev, were instrumental in abolishing the inadequate 
contract system42. Annual Russian production increased nearly five-fold in the 
seven years between 1863 (41,000 barrels), and 1870 (204,000 barrels)43. 
According to Owen, production reached over 34 million barrels by 189 1 44. A 
few years later in 1898, Russia became the number one oil producer in the world, 
a position it held until 1902, just as the giant Californian fields were being
39 ]bi<i,p. 62.
40 Owen, op. eit., pp. 1356-1357.
41 Gökay, op. cit.. p. 10.
42 ibid, p. 7.
43 ibid.
44 Owen, op. cit.. p. 1357.
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developed. Production peaked at 85,168,000 barrels in 1901, with all, but 4 
million barrels, coming from Baku45. In the decade, 1891-1900, output of oil, 
according to Nove, ‘kept pace with that of the United States, and in fact in 1900 
Russia’s oil production was the highest in the world, being slightly ahead of 
America’s’46.
In 1901, Russian oil, from 1,900 wells, in a six square mile region in the 
Caucasus, supplied over fifty percent of the world’s needs, and a staggering 95 
percent came from the Absheron peninsula47. Whilst the overwhelming majority 
of oil was found in and around Baku, other places, such as Grozny in the North 
Caucasus also shared in the good fortune. There the first well was drilled in 
1893, and by 1910, production was approximately 8.8 million barrels, a 
significant quantity . Oil from the Caspian was to provide the bulk of Russian 
and later Soviet oil until other fields in the Urals-Volga region were discovered 
in the 1940s.
T able 3.1 Percentage of Azerbaijan Crude for Total Soviet Production49
Year A m o u n t
1930 57%
1940 71%
1950 39%
1960 12%
1970 6%
1975 3%
1980 3%
45 ibid.
46 Alec Nove, An Economic History o f the USSR, (2nd Edition), (London: Penguin Books, 1989). 
p. 3.
47 Gökay, op. cit.. p. 8.
48 ibid., p. 10.
49 Cynthia Croissant, op. cit.. p. 22.
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The First Decline of the Caspian (1902-1928)
The Caspian lost its primary position in oil production, not just because of the 
ever increasing oil production in the US and later the rise of the Middle East, but 
also because of the growing political and social unrest in the region itself, which 
was further compounded by the rather primitive technological methods employed 
in oil extraction. In fifteen short years from 1901, oil production had quadrupled 
in the US, reaching 40 million tons by 1915, whereas in Russia, production had 
essentially stagnated in the same period, dropping to 8 million tons in 1905, and 
hovering just above 10 million tons in 1915, with exports amounting to a mere 
78 thousand tons50. The growing disquiet stemmed from a number of factors not 
the least being poor economic conditions for the workers51. It also provided a 
young failed Seminary student, Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, an 
opportunity to promote Lenin and Bolshevism, amongst the growing civil 
agitation, in both T’Bilisi and Baku' . This student was later to be known as 
Joseph Stalin.
The unrest was also a response to the oppression from the Tsarist regime, which 
resulted in an almost never-ending series of strikes and ethnically based 
violence53. Strikes were reported in 1901-2 in Batumi, followed by the oil 
worker strike of July 1903, then strikes again in 1904, 1905 and 190754. Whilst 
this unrest was occurring, there was also the constitutional crisis of 1905-6, and 
the ill-advised Russo-Japan war of 1904-5. The protests and riots in Batumi and 
Baku were in part ethnically motivated, and that issue, along with energy 
reserves, continues to dominate the Caucasus and Northern Caucasus region 
today. Baku, at this time, also had a growing urban population that contributed
50 Figures from Table 2.1 Early Russian and American Oil Production and Exports in Goldman, 
op. cit., pp.14-15.
51 For a more detailed analysis of the strikes in Georgia at this time see: Ronald Grigor Suny. The 
Making o f the Georgian Nation (2nd Edition) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). pp. 
161-164.'
^ Goldenberg, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
53 According to Goldenberg, employment in the oil industry was a reflection of ownership which 
worked against the local Azerbaijan population who were relegated to the unskilled work, 
whereas the Armenians, and others, took the more skilled positions, ibid, p. 28.
54 ibid, p. 20.
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to social tensions. In 1913 it was reported that the urban population in 
Azerbaijan was 24 percent, the highest in the empire and during the 1920s-30s, 
the urban population rose to 36.1 percent55. Part of the reason for this increased 
social and economic tension, was that prior to the oil boom the region was the 
least urbanised of all the Caucasus56.
The importance of Baku began to diminish during this period for a number of 
factors, one of which reflected on the inappropriate drilling equipment and 
techniques used. A large number of wells were shallow, so the full extent of the 
reserves could not be exploited. The use of inappropriate techniques also 
resulted in excessive waste, as well as decreased supply potential57. Baku was 
also declining in significance because of the rising importance of other fields 
within the Soviet Union such as Grozny, Emba on the north shore of the Caspian
r o
Sea, and Maikop near the Black Sea . These last two factors, inappropriate 
techniques and emerging new fields, are primarily why the Caspian basin 
decreased in importance. It was not so much because it was thought the fields 
were drying up, which was widely perceived but never really proven, but because 
the newly discovered fields were initially closer to the populous western regions 
of Russia. This meant that transportation hurdles were less of an issue, and 
therefore access to the product was much easier. This logic regarding the limited 
life expectancy of the Caspian oil fields was followed through into the Soviet 
period of exploration.
The Role of Caspian Oil in the Soviet Union
Russian, and later Soviet society, was characterised by a relatively low level 
standard of living, which in turn resulted in a lower per capita use of oil and 
petroleum products, when compared with other countries. As Goldman points
55 Cynthia Croissant, op. cit.. pp. 20-21.
56 Goldenberg, op. cit.. p. 27.
37 Yergin relates that Baku was characterised by a series of extraordinary oil fountains or gushers. 
“One called Droozba/Droozhba (Friendship) gushed for five months at the rate of 43,000 barrels 
a day, most of it wasted”. Yergin, op. cit.. p. 61.
58 Goldman, op, cit.. p. 19.
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out, ‘In the late nineteenth century, Russian consumption of kerosene was one- 
half of that in Germany09. This antipathy to oil continued during the Soviet 
Union as Jones mentions that,
the early industrial structure of the USSR was not oil orientated, coal 
and ignite being the preferred industrial fuel and coal fired railways 
the predominate system of long-distance land transportation60.
It was not until the 1950s that the Soviet Union moved to embrace oil and gas as 
the principle source of energy61. Since domestic productive capacity continued 
to exceed domestic petroleum needs, the use of oil, especially after the advent of 
the internal combustion engine, as a valuable export earner was almost assured 
and readily exploited.
The role of oil in the Soviet Union remained essentially the same as under the 
Tsars. It was viewed as a cash commodity, not as significant as grain, but still 
important. Before the revolution, grain accounted for 50 to 70 percent of all 
export earnings between 1895 and 1914 . Russia at the turn of the century, as in 
the early days of the Soviet state, had an agricultural economy. The industrial 
revolution that began in 1770, in the mills of England, did not reach Russia until 
the early 1880s, and only then in a limited fashion63. Significant industrial 
advancement only really occurred after the end of the civil war in 1921, with the 
consolidation of power by Lenin and the Bolsheviks. However, even with the 
crash industrialisation, instituted by Stalin, it was not until 1929, that oil 
production began to recoup the losses from the previous 27 years of seemingly 
continued stagnation and mayhem. In that year, production finally surpassed the
59 ibid., p. 17.
60 Peter Ellis Jones, Oil A practical guide to the economics o f world petroleum, (Cambridge: 
Woodhead-Faulkner, 1988). p. 258.
61 Goldman., op. cit.. pp. 49-50.
62 ibid, p. 21.
63 For a more detailed discussion on Russian industrialisation during this period see: Edward 
Acton, Russia The Tsarist and Russian Legacy, (2nd Edition), (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 
93-119.
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1901 figure with 13,684,000 metric tons produced64, and by 1932, petroleum 
accounted for 18 percent of foreign earnings65. Important as this may seem, oil 
did not transcend the income earned from either grain or timber exports for some 
time.
The Nazi invasion during World War II, and the destruction of many Soviet oil 
wells in the north Caucasus region, also encouraged the development of other 
fields. Although often not cited, the spectre of another invasion would have 
contributed to the eventual down-grading of the Caspian region. Regardless, it 
provided an incentive for oil exploration in other parts of the Soviet Union66. In 
both world wars, the oil fields around Baku and Grozny were seen as 
geostrategic objectives for a number of actors, including the English . In 1941, 
Soviet oil production peaked at 31 millions tons , of which over 25 million came 
from Azerbaijan69. Ironically contributing to this was the Nazi-Soviet Pact. In 
1940, exports of oil to Nazi Germany accounted for 657,000 tons, 75 percent of 
all Soviet petroleum exports70. The Nazi occupation of Grozny resulted in a 
significant decline in oil production from Azerbaijan. Although Grozny is some 
300 miles to the north from Baku, the main pipelines than, as they do now, ran 
north through the city itself. This restricted supply to the Soviet war machine, 
which in turn considerably hampered the Soviet response to the Nazi advance. 
The results of this saw oil production in Azerbaijan fall to 15.8 million tons in
64 Goldman, op. cit.. p. 22.
65 ibid, p.31.
66 Jones, loc. cit.
67 See Jamil Hassanov, “The Struggle for Azerbaijani Oil at the end of the First World War”. 
Caspian Crossroads Magazine, Volume 2, Number 4, (Spring, 1997), at 
www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/casp.htm [28/12/98]; also see Nigyar 
Maxwell, “The Oil Issue in the Policy of Azerbaijan’s Government in 1918-1920” Caspian 
Crossroads Magazine Volume 2, Number 3, (Winter, 1997), at 
www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/casp.htm [28/12/98].
68 Goldman, op. cit.. p. 33.
69 Cynthia Croissant, op. cit., p. 21.
70 Goldman, op. cit.. p. 26.
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1942, then 12.6 million in 1943, 11.8 million in 1944 and 10.4 million in 194571. 
This trend was never reversed during the remaining days of the Soviet Union.
Soviet Methods of Oil Exploration & The Second Decline of the 
Caspian
The decrease in oil output from the Caspian basin was not necessarily a reduction 
in production per se. It happened because other fields such as the Volga-Urals 
were coming on line by the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1960, oil was found 
on the river Konda approximately 500 miles east of Perm’ and in 1965, a giant 
field was discovered a further 500 miles to the east of this . The decline of the 
importance of Caspian oil was further exacerbated with the discovery of oil in 
Siberia in the 1960s. The Volga-Urals fields, the ‘Second Baku’ as it was 
referred to, was originally discovered in 1932, but its development was delayed 
because of a ‘shortage of proper drilling equipment’ . Olaf Caroe says that oil 
production in this region, along with other related heavy industries was 
developed ‘largely by the use of Kazak unskilled labour74. The issue of 
inadequate drilling technology had first appeared in the Caspian during the 
nineteenth century. Combined with inflexible Soviet planning methods, this 
obstacle continued to plague Soviet oil exploration and production, until the very 
end of the USSR itself.
There were many concerns about Soviet exploration techniques, especially the 
focus on quantity rather than quality, hence the many shallow wells drilled that 
were unproductive. It was reported that in parts of Kazakstan the land was 
‘becoming increasingly pitted with shallow exploratory holes drilled in incessant 
pursuit of a larger number of total metres drilled’75. Guided by the State 
Planning Authority (Gosplan), as well as the Ministry of Geology, who used as a
71 Figures from Table 4, Oil Output in Azerbaijan During the Second World War. Cynthia 
Croissant, loc. cit.
72 Goldman, op. cit., p. 35.
72 ibid., p. 30.
74 Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire The Turks o f Central Asia and Stalinism, (London: Macmillian and 
Co Ltd, 1967). p. 190.
73 Goldman, op. cit., p. 46.
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benchmark the total number of metres drilled, Soviet prospectors soon realised 
that the deeper they dug the less likely they were to meet their planned targets. 
Hence the more shallow exploratory wells drilled, the better. The target would 
be met and the bonus paid, whether anything was found or not. In 1978 an 
article appeared in Pravda stating that ‘Deep drilling means reducing the speed 
of the work and reducing the group’s bonuses’ . This was part symptomatic of 
the Soviet oil industry, and because drilling technology was years behind the rest 
of the world. Because of the many years of this insidious practice there is 
speculation that some of these wells may actually lead to reserves, only much 
deeper down.
According to the CIA, it took more than a year for a Soviet driller to drill 3,000 
metres, five times longer than the world average77. This is because Soviet drill 
bit quality was below world standard, as was the quality of steel pipe used in the 
process. The reason for this inordinate time frame was twofold. Firstly, the 
Soviet drillers tended to spend approximately 85 percent of their time 
unproductively. Most of the time was wasted frequently withdrawing the pipe­
string to replace the drill bit and then to reinsert. This occurred because of the 
second reason: Soviet steel pipe and the drill bit, turbo or otherwise, simply did 
not last long enough, the quality of workmanship was lacking. To help 
overcome the second obstacle, the Soviet Union began to import higher quality 
steel pipe for use in drilling, and also for use in the vast oil and gas pipeline 
system across the republics. In all fairness to the Soviets it was not uncommon, 
and still is the case today, to import steel for pipelines, as the US imported 
Japanese steel for its Alaskan pipeline project . As well as importing higher 
grade steel than could be produced through Soviet production processes, the 
Soviets also began to build several ‘foreign high-grade steel factories with the 
hope of solving their steel quality deficiency’ .
76 Pravda, 27 January 1978, cited in Goldman, ibid.
77 Ibid, pp. 41-42.
78 Goldman, loc. cit.
79 ibid.
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Glavtransneft
The continual moving of the epicentre of Soviet energy production, coupled with 
the demands of a command economy resulted in the building of the pipeline 
network known as Glavtransneft. The system consisted of over 65,000 
kilometres of primary lines, 400 pump stations and a capacity of 600 million tons 
per year80. Although a prime example of the Soviet economic model even with 
the demise of the Soviet Union, which gave the republics ownership of pipelines 
within their borders, the now privatised Russian successor company Transneft 
still has considerable power to limit or even cut off oil exports from various 
regions of the former USSR. Glavtransneft, as a pipeline system, was built to 
cater to the Soviet command economy, shipping oil to various locations within 
the Soviet Union, or to the satellite states in eastern Europe. As a result, the 
pipeline direction that Transneft inherited is not suitable, in the main, for the 
exporting of Caspian basin reserves. The Baku-Grozny line for example actually 
flows south from Grozny to Baku. It is the very existence of Transneft, and its 
original function, to be an internal distributor of energy reserves which has 
necessitated the requirement to build new, and more reliable export orientated 
pipeline routes. There is another factor, often overlooked, when discussing the 
Transneft system. Russia still produces vast amounts of oil, as well as natural 
gas, and needs the pipeline system for its own use. Within the Caspian region 
there are five major sections of the Transneft system, linking Russia, Kazakstan, 
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia together .
1. 1,900-mile pipeline linking Omsk (Russia) - Pavlodar (Kazakstan) - 
Chimkent (Kazakstan) - Chardzhou (Turkmenistan).
2. 2,200-mile pipeline linking Novorossiysk (Russia) - Grozny 
(Chechnya/Russia) - Atyraü (Kazakstan) - Tengiz (Kazakstan) - 
Aktau (Kazakstan).
80 Richard H. Matzke, “Pipelines to Progress: FSU Oil exports Past, Present, Future”, National 
Association o f Petroleum Investment Analysts (21 May 1997) at 
www.chevron.com/chevron_root/newsvs/speeches/1997/97-5-21 -matzke.html [26/12/1998],
81 Table 4.2 Existing and proposed Oil Pipelines. Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy. 
Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East, (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace/ Brookings Institution Press: Washington, 1997). p. 140.
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3. 900-mile pipeline linking Novorossiysk (Russia) - Grozny 
(Chechnya/Russia) - Baku (Azerbaijan).
4. 600-mile pipeline linking Batumi (Georgia) - Baku (Azerbaijan).
5. 600-mile pipeline linking Atyraü (Kazakstan) - Samara (Russia).
Tengiz
It would be appropriate at this juncture to mention the Tengiz field in Kazakstan, 
which may serve as a quintessential case study of energy development in the 
Caspian region during the Soviet period. Tengiz is a hydrocarbon deposit that is 
deemed to be a giant field at approximately 200 square miles in size, and as 
mentioned in Chapter two, is located a short distance inland from the Caspian 
Sea in the western Kazakstan oblast of Atyraü. It was initially discovered in the 
1960s, and the Soviet Union had already embarked on some preliminary 
development of the field in the 1980s . However the Soviets were hampered, by 
their own command-administrative system. Soviet attempts at increased 
exploitation of the Tengiz field in the 1980s resulted in 60 wells producing about 
three million tons of oil per year by 199 083. Tengiz crude, which is rated at 47- 
degree API gravity , which is much higher than Russian/Soviet oil, lies 
however, very deep, along with a high hydrogen-sulphide and mercaptan content. 
Because of the mercaptan level the Soviets required Western technology, to 
remove the mercaptans and de-sulphurise the crude, in order to fully exploit the 
significant reserves85. In order to overcome these obstacles, of depth and 
mercaptan content, Gorbachev, in 1988, quietly instigated negotiations with
o z
Chevron for an infusion of foreign capital and expertise .
82 ibid., p. 139.
83 Vladimir Babek, “Kazakstan: Big Politics Around Big Oil” in Michael Croissant and Biilent 
Aras, (eds.). Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, (Westport: Praeger, 1999). p. 194.
84 API Gravity is the conventional method of expressing the gravity of crude oils. It is an 
arbitrary scale adopted by the American Petroleum Institute. As each crude oil has its own 
unique characteristics and is given an API degree rating in relation to its specific gravity 
compared to that of water. On the API scale, water is given a 10 Degree API rating. The higher 
the degree, the lighter is the crude oil.
85 Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics o f Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). p. 37.
86 Babek, loc. cit.
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The impasse with the Tengiz field, which was producing a commendable 
quantity, as well as quality of crude, yet could not improve without foreign 
capital and technology, is a clear example of the torpid nature that was the Soviet 
oil industry in the final years of the USSR87. These are the same obstacles that 
were repeatedly encountered during the development of other fields in the Soviet 
Union. How many other fields in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) need an 
injection of capital and expertise because Soviet technology had reached its 
limits ? Seeing that Soviet technology was incapable of adequately exploring 
and exploiting potential fields, a question arises as to how much oil and gas is 
literally just sitting there, just beyond the reach of dated Soviet technology, but 
not beyond the reach of foreign companies with the technology and the capital 
resources ?
Oil Production in the USSR
If Tengiz is any indication, it would appear that any future growth in the Soviet 
oil industry would have been dependent on foreign investment and knowledge. 
Aside from continued exploration advances in technology resulted in a down turn 
in real terms. The last official Soviet statistics covering the first nine months of
o o
1991, showed that oil production had fallen by nine percent . In fact planned 
petroleum production had failed to achieve production targets as table 3.2 clearly 
demonstrates;
Table 3.2 Soviet Oil Production: Real and Planned 1965-198589
1965 1970 1975 1980 19 8 5 19 8 6 1987
O il (A c tu a l)  
M illio n  T o n s
243 353 491 604 595 610 624
O il (P la n n e d )  
M illio n  T o n s
350 505 640 632
87 For detailed description of the need for foreign expertise in moving a focus of the then Soviet 
oil industry to offshore locations in the Caspian basin see; Stephen Lewame, Soviet Oil The Move 
Offshore, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1988). pp. 63-78.
88 Hooman Peimani, Regional Security and the Future o f Central Asia: The Competition o f Iran, 
Turkey and Russia (Connecticut: Praeger, 1998). p. 92.
8<> Nove, op. cit.. pp. 370-371 and Table 2.1 USSR Petroleum Production (1960-1987), Lewame, 
op. cit.. p. 11.
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As oil output began to stagnate, and world prices began to fall once again, this 
led to a sharp drop in Soviet hard currency earnings90. In an economy that was 
so dependent on oil, and to a lesser extent gas exports, for its hard currency 
exports, the eventual outcome were simply academic. This reliance on crude oil 
as a hard currency earner has continued for the Russian Federation. According to 
Jaffe and Manning, in 1996, Russian Federation oil exports alone generated some 
$16.1 Billion dollars, some 20 percent of total revenue export91. Lewame states 
that during the Soviet period, resources required to produce oil were almost twice 
as high as for coal and gas . In spite of this cost imbalance the Soviets allowed 
20 billion cubic metres of natural gas to be flared in 1975, telling inditement of 
the predilection for oil as a cash crop during the Soviet period. This was a 
common occurrence in emerging industrial economies, and was also practiced by 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, but as Goldman rightly states ‘industrialisation [was] a 
prime goal, therefore their flaring was extremely wasteful’93.
Driven by a command economy that relied on hydrocarbons as means to fund 
industrialisation, the Soviet Union had reached a pivotal juncture in 1987, when 
Gorbachev wrote Perestroika (restructuring)94. Part of the novoe myshlenie (new 
thinking), that Gorbachev allowed was to invite foreign MNCs to develop what 
the Soviet Union could not. This invitation was a result of glasnost (openness), 
and the realisation that expansion of the hydrocarbon industry could only 
advance with the aid of foreign capital and expertise. This necessity has 
continued for the republics of Kazakstan and Azerbaijan, and to a lesser extent 
Turkmenistan. The desire to develop Caspian hydrocarbon reserves has however 
come at a high cost for these republics, and is the focus of the final chapter.
90 Nove, ibid, 378.
91 Amy Meyers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “The Shocks of a World of Cheap Oil”, Foreign 
Affairs Volume 79, Number 1 (January/February, 2000), p. 22.
92 Lewame, op. cit.. p. 14.
93 Goldman, loc. cit.
94 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika (London: William Collins, 1987).
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Chapter Four
The Routes and the Implications
The Routes
Thus far this thesis has commented upon, and examined, a number of important 
components intrinsic to understanding the Caspian; the vexed issue of exactly 
how much oil there is, the unique geography of the region, environmental 
consequences directly related to energy reserve exploration, the effects of 
monoculture and the legal status of the Caspian Sea. In order to correctly 
identify implications from exploitation and extraction, this thesis provided an 
overview of the importance of hydrocarbon reserves, in particular oil, to the 
Caspian, including both the methods utilised to extract and to transport the 
product, as well as the importance of oil as a hard currency earner for both the 
Tsarist and Soviet regimes. Central to this work has been the understanding that 
the many and varied contemporaneous issues directly related to the Caspian, such 
as those discussed in this work can only effectively be viewed through the dual 
prism of geopolitics and geostrategy.
At the outset it was stated that;
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the implications and 
subsequent ramifications of the exploitation and extraction of energy 
reserves from the Caspian basin. It is this work’s contention that the 
ramifications are primarily of a geopolitical and geostrategic nature 
that have, in the first place, affected the littoral states of the Caspian 
Sea: Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran and the Russian 
Federation and primarily the first three Former Soviet Republics.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify those implications, based upon the 
discourse of the preceding chapters. In order to support this outcome, this thesis 
will examine the main transit corridors that are, or intend to be, used for the 
transportation of Caspian energy reserves. Individual actors involvement will be
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addressed, relevant to the pipeline route under discussion. This approach is valid 
because the pipelines, real or imagined, have provided the catalyst for 
geopolitical manoeuvring from actors whose interests are found in the direction 
they will eventually take. It is worth remembering that the debate about possible 
routes is, as Olcott says, ‘not so much about the best routes as much as it is about 
least worst routes’1 2.
There are several transportation routes relevant to exporting Caspian basin 
energy reserves, and of this number, a few are mere ‘pipe-dreams’. The main 
transport routes have been designated, by some, as the Northern (via, but not to,
'y
Russia), Southern (via Iran), and Central (via the Caucasus) options . Of these 
only the Central and Northern options are currently inuse.
These options are however, too narrow when seeking to consider the 
geopolitical and geostrategic issues associated with Caspian basin energy 
reserves. There are a number of other options being touted including; South- 
West (via Turkey), South-East (via Afghanistan), Western (via China), North- 
Western ‘A’ (via Ukraine), and North-Western ‘B’ (via Bulgaria), as well as 
other transportation variants such as oil swaps and shipping via rail and barge. A 
purely northern route for exporting product to Russia is not economically 
feasible due to Russia’s own abundant hydrocarbon reserves, and limited 
pipeline capacity.
It is only, however, the Northern and Central options, and shipping via rail, as 
well as a number of oil swaps, that are currently being utilised by countries such 
as Azerbaijan and Kazakstan. The other options are either, mere pipe-dreams 
such as Ukraine and Bulgaria, not currently feasible due to external geopolitical 
pressure; Iran and Afghanistan , or yet to be actually constructed; Turkey and
1 Martha Brill Olcott, “Oil and Politics in Kazakhstan” Caspian Crossroads Magazine, Volume 
1, Number 1, (Winter 1995) at www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/casp.htm 
[28/12/98].
2 John Roberts, Caspian Pipelines (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 3.
33 A very recent publication from Ahmed Rashid devotes three chapters to the possibility of a 
pipeline extending south through Taliban controlled Afghanistan, see: Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: 
Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000). pp. 143-182.
80
China. However the Turkish option needs to be examined in detail as it presents 
a salient example of geopolitical pressure.
The question is further complicated by the fact that there are also multiple 
options in termination, or options for delivery post-termination, in particular 
product loaded at Novorossiysk and Supsa, and it is important to consider how 
these may affect other possible pipeline choices. The corridors that merit 
discussion which have an immediate impact on the region are Tengiz- 
Novorossiysk and Baku-Supsa/Novorossiysk. Routes that involve tanker 
transportation via the Black Sea currently have three possible exit options, 
Odessa (Ukraine), Burgas (Bulgaria) or via the Bosphorus Straits. Should 
Ukraine actually build its long discussed pipeline from Odessa to Brody, then 
this will have a very substantial impact on actors such as Russia and Turkey. 
The notion of tanker transfers at Burgas have again resurfaced, this time with a 
pipeline terminating in the Adriatic Sea at Vlore (Albania). The likelihood of 
this proposed pipeline coming to fruition is however improbable. As with other 
pipeline discussions the question of who is going to pay for such a project and 
the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) can be mutually 
exclusive.
An assessment of the Bosphorus choke-point4 is obligatory, as transporting 
product, from the Novorossiysk and Supsa corridors south through this 
exceedingly narrow and highly congested waterway has significant geostrategic 
implications. A discussion about the proposed Baku-T’bilisi-Ceyhan as the Main 
Export Pipeline (MEP) must be undertaken, as this will impact on Bosphorus 
tanker traffic and on Azerbaijan and Georgia.
4 The Bosphorus is but one of several narrow shipping lanes with a potential for closure (choke- 
point) that in 1998 saw a combined total of 30 million barrels a day pass through them. Other 
choke-points include Bab el-Mandeb, near Djibouti, the Panama Canal, Strait of Hormuz, Strait 
of Malacca and the Suez Canal. A choke-point is not restricted to a waterway, the Sumed 
pipeline in Egypt is also choke-point, as are a number of Russian pipelines because they are 
operating a maximum capacity. “World Oil Chokepoints” (August 1999) United States Energy 
Information Administration, at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke.html [11/12/2000].
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Tengiz-Novorossiysk
As mentioned previously the Tengiz field is considered to be the largest field that 
has been discovered in recent times, and development of this field could not have 
occurred without the injection of vast sums of foreign capital. It is now more 
than ten years since Gorbachev initially invited Chevron to participate in 
exploiting this field. The past decade has shown how uncertain energy 
exploration in the FSU can be, with numerous obstacles placed in front of 
MNCs, and in Chevron’s case, from both the Kazak and Russian governments in 
regards to exploiting and extracting product from the Tengiz field. From the 
outset the Tengiz project was ambitious. Richard Matzke described Tengiz as 
“Chevron’s biggest and most important project since the opening of Saudi Arabia 
about 50 years ago”5. To fully exploit this field Chevron is involved in two 
parallel projects: Tengizchevroil, which is the consortium seeking to extract the 
reserves, and the Caspian Pipeline Company which is responsible for the upgrade 
and the building of a new pipeline from Tengiz to Novorossiysk, as well as new 
terminal facilities. Discussion of consortium participants demonstrates the 
fluidity of energy reserve exploration in the Caspian, and the pressure that 
various actors can apply to achieve their aims.
Tengizchevroil and the Caspian Pipeline Company (CPC)
In April 1993 Kazakstan and Chevron formally signed an agreement to create 
what was to become Tengizchevroil (TCO) joint venture6. In order to ship 
Tengiz crude to the Black Sea a new pipeline infrastructure was required as well 
as upgrading parts of the existing Russian pipeline. The Caspian Pipeline 
Company (CPC) was established to build a 1,580 kilometre pipeline from Tengiz 
to Novorossiysk Marine Terminal-2. A new pipeline is to be built between 
Komsomolskaya and the new Marine Terminal at Novorossiysk, as well as 
refurbishment of exisiting pipeline between Tengiz and Komsomolskaya. 
Originally a joint-venture agreement was signed in 1992, between Kazakstan and
5 Cited in Robert V. Barylski, “Russia, the West, and the Caspian Energy Hub” The Middle East 
Journal Volume 49, Number 2, (Spring, 1995), p. 227.
6 Richard H. Matzke, “Chevron’s Caspian Commitment” Fifth Kazakstan International Oil and
Gas Exposition (Almaty, 2 October 1997) at
www.chevron.com/chevron_root/newvs/speeches/1997/97-10-02.html [01/02/2000].
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Oman to form the CPC and this agreement was expanded to include Russia7 8. 
However Chevron was not offered an equity stake, and for four long years the 
CPC and Chevron, who is the pipelines primary customer were in disagreement. 
Undaunted Chevron used a variety of methods to export Tengiz oil to market. In 
a speech in 1997 Matzke recounts the following:
Recently we completed a shipment from Tengiz to the Black Sea.
First we filled rail cars with oil in Tengiz and moved them to Aqtaü on 
the Caspian. From there, the oil moved by barge across the Caspian to 
Baku, where a pipeline moved the oil for reloading to Ali Bayramli in 
Azerbaijan for reloading into railcars, and then on to the port of
o
Batumi. From there it travels by tanker out to the Mediterranean .
This is a clear example of the problems of shipping product out of the region 
when access to pipelines is restricted. The mercaptan content of Tengiz crude 
was another hurdle placed in the path of Chevron. Mercaptans are corrosive 
compounds, that require a specialised extraction process in order to improve the 
marketability. Where mercaptans are present the blending of different graded 
crude, which is Russian policy when using Transneft is not possible. As a reuslt 
Russia repeatedly restricted the flow of Kazak oil through its pipeline system on 
these grounds. In order to overcome this impasse Chevron put in place a de- 
mercaptanisation facilities at cost of up to $100 million9. Dissatisfied with the 
stalled CPC negotiations Chevron realised that the only way to overcome the 
hurdle of pipelines was either to build their own, or to sweeten the deal for the 
Russians. Chevron proposed that Russia would receive a larger share of CPC, 
and that the tax exempt status of the CPC be revoked10. As a result of the 
insistence of Chevron, a new arrangement was agreed to. It is now a consortium 
of countries and various oil companies with shares ranging in size from 24
7 Roberts, op. cit.. p. 24.
8 Richard H. Matzke, “Pipelines to Progress: FSU Oil exports Past, Present, Future”, National 
Association o f Petroleum Investment Analysts (21 May 1997) at 
www.chevron.com/chevron_root/newsvs/speeches/1997/97-5-21 -matzke.html [26/12/1998].
9 Roberts, op. cit.. p. 30.
10 ibid, p. 31.
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percent to 1.75 percent. The major shareholders of CPC are the Russian 
Federation (24 percent), Kazakstan (19 percent), Oman (7 percent), Chevron (15) 
percent and LUKarco with (12.5) percent. The primary customer will continue 
to be TCO which is now made up of Chevron (45 percent), Mobil (25 percent), 
Kazakstan, (25 percent) and LUKarco, (5 percent).
In order to accommodate the increased volume at Novorossiysk, which is the 
deepest port in the Black Sea, significant improvements need to be made. The 
Sheskharis oil terminal is divided into 5 sections: three dry cargo, one passenger 
terminal and Sheskharis, with a total of thirty quays that have an annual capacity 
of 40,000,000 tonnes of cargo. Weather, as in the neighbouring Caspian Sea, is 
inclement in winter months which sees the port closed for about 60-70 days 
every year, a significant downtime period. A total of $63 million dollars is being 
spent to double the handling capacity at Sheskharis to 30 million tonnes a year, 
or nearly 220 million barrel per year11. The repercussions of this increase will 
adversely affect the relationship between Russia and Turkey, the two countries 
that stand to make the most from transit fees from Caspian oil.
The enhancements to the port of Novorossiysk clearly indicate that Russia is 
keen to increase the amount of product that can be transferred into tankers for the 
journey south. In addition to this it has been revealed that Novorossiysk 
Steamship (Novoship) ordered in 1996 twelve double-hulled 40,000dwt tankers 
from Croatia, (valued at $225 million dollars), and in 1997 ordered from Japan 
six double-hulled 106,000dwt tankers . Novoship already has 90 tankers in use, 
making it the seventh largest oil shipping company in the world. Regardless of 
what Turkey says about the dangers posed by increased tanker traffic to the 
Bosphorus it is obvious that Russia is going to amplify the number of south­
bound passages through the Bosphorus.
11 “Can Novorossiysk Handle the Caspian Oil Boom ?” Central Asia Caucasus Analyst (14 
February 1999) at www.cacianalyst.org/archives/issue%203%,%20Feb%2099/Oil%20Boom.htm 
[15/08/2000],
12 ibid.
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Baku-Supsa/Novorossiysk
Transportation of oil from Baku presents perhaps the most salient example of 
geopolitical pressure in regards to pipeline direction. It also has provided several 
stark reminders that Azerbaijan, as well as neighbouring Armenia, Georgia and 
the Northern Caucasus, is viewed by the Russian Federation as an area being 
well within its orbit of interest, and will act accordingly. Whereas Kazakstan 
certainly has a significant foreign investment, notably from Chevron, Azerbaijan 
has seen much wider involvement and a change of government that can be 
directly attributed, in part, to the coercion related to energy reserve exploitation.
Baku has a number of early oil and late oil options at its disposal. The Baku- 
Grozny-Novorossiysk line, the Baku-T’bilisi-Supsa line and the Baku-Batumi 
railroad, as well as the proposed Baku-T’bilisi-Ceyhan MEP. All, except the 
last, have been characterised as ‘early’ oil options. There are three important 
reasons why the Baku-T’bilisi-Ceyhan route as the MEP has been proposed. The 
first reason is that the US government does not want the exportation of Caspian 
crude to be held accountable to the unilateral actions of Russia. Secondly, the 
US favours any route not through Iran. Thirdly, pressure from Turkey over the 
overused Turkish Straits (Bosphorus/Istanbul and (^anakkale Straits), and its 
desire to gain a financial windfall from transit fees played a major factor as well.
Black Sea Options
One option that actually can benefit the Kazak and Azeri governments, as well as 
restricting Russian influence, is to ship oil to Odessa in the Ukraine and then 
further north via the 670 kilometre Odessa-Brody pipeline, which has been under 
sporadic construction for a number of years. There is already a precedent for this 
as the first shipment of oil through the Baku-Supsa pipeline, in April 1999, did in 
fact go to Odessa, via Constanta in Romania . However regular shipments have 
not occurred. Ukraine, ‘a big country using energy in inefficient ways’14 needs
13 Steve Remp, “Dancing with Elephants Pioneering Oil and Gas in the Caspian, Central and 
Eastern Europe”, Central Asian Caucasus Analyst Forum Summary (19 May 1999) at 
www.cacianalyst.org/forumsummaries/may%20Elephants.htm [16/06/2000].
14 Ottar Skagen, Caspian Gas (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997). p.55.
85
to import large amounts of both oil and gas if its economy is to function. 
Domestic production of gas is only 10 percent and 20 percent for oil, forcing it to 
import 35 million tons of oil and 40-55 billion cubic metres of gas each year15. 
The oil is almost exclusively imported from Russia and over half the gas from 
Turkmenistan. Kiev has defaulted on payment to both Moscow and Ashgabad 
(Ashgabat) several times, and even has resorted to payments in kind, to Moscow, 
in the form of strategic bombers16. Russia has also sought to swap Ukrainian 
debt for direct shares in Ukrainian companies . The accumulated debt to 
Turkmenistan, in the beginning of 1997, was $1,083 billion dollars, which has 
periodically resulted in either a decrease in supply, or a temporary suspension of
1 o
shipment of the product . In 1999, Turkmenistan suspended supplies until 
October later that year, and under a new arrangement to ensure uninterrupted 
supplies, Ukraine is to make weekly payments of $7 million in cash and $9 
million in goods19.
Debt, specifically ongoing debt, is commonplace in the FSU. Russia, in 1995, 
owed Gazprom an estimated 16 trillion roubles ($4.7 billion dollars) for product 
delivered in 1994. In 1996 debt to Gazprom from domestic Russian customers 
reached $7.5 billion dollars, and $3.3 billion from other customers in the FSU . 
Ukraine is heavily dependent upon natural gas shipments from both 
Turkmenistan and Russia, but has some flexibility in seeking new trading 
partners for its oil needs with the advent of Caspian oil. President Kuchma of 
Ukraine has openly stated that as long as ‘Ukraine’s Achilles heel is its total
15 Bohdan Klid, “Ukraine as a Transportation Corridor for Caspian Oil to Europe” Caspian 
Crossroads Magazine, Volume 3, Number 1 (summer 1997) at 
www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/313htm. [28/12/1998].
“Russia seeks to Expand Control of Ukraine” at 
www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/0002250112.htm [23/06/2000].
17 ibid.
iH Akira Miyamoto, Natural Gas in Central Asia: Industries, Markets and Export Options o f 
Kazakstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1997). p. 45.
|l) Dow Jones International News (11/01/2000) via Caspian Clips (International Institute for 
Caspian Studies; Tehran) E-Mail list [11/01/2000].
20 Valery Kryukov and Arlid Moe, The New Russian Corporatism ? A Case Study o f Gazprom 
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996). p.25.
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dependence on Russia for its supplies of oil, natural gas and nuclear energy, it
21cannot but be deeply interested in Kazakstan’s oil and gas exports’ .
To loosen the noose that Russia has around Ukraine, Caspian oil could flow 
through the, (as-yet incomplete), pipeline from Odessa which would eventually 
link up to the southern arm of the 1.25 million bpd Druzhba pipeline, which 
services the likes of Poland and Slovakia. The Druzhba pipeline, ironically, 
provides Ukraine with the opportunity to charge a tariff on Russia for exporting 
its own hydrocarbon reserves through Ukrainian territory. However, Gazprom, 
operator of the pipeline, recently announced that it would no longer argue with 
Ukraine over an outstanding gas debt of $1.9 billion dollars. Instead, Gazprom 
has decided to build pipelines bypassing Ukraine, bad debts and tariffs included, 
and the issue of 90 percent of its exports moving through Ukraine . This last 
factor explains why both the Russian government and Gazprom have sought to 
acquire hard assets in Ukraine in order to use these as a buffer to Ukrainian 
attempts of constricting flow of natural gas to central Europe. LUKoil has also 
been actively seeking to appropriate assets in the Ukraine. In April 1999, a 
subsidiary of LUKoil acquired a 51.9 precent controlling stake in the Odessa 
refinery, which porcessed two million tons of oil in 1998 .
This approach of acquiring strategic assets is part of Russian endeavours to 
increase both political and economic influence and control over the FSU where 
direct military coercion is not feasible. Even if Ukraine was successful in 
convincing the likes of Azerbaijan and Kazakstan to send oil via Odessa there are 
a number of very important constraints upon the long term viability of this 
option. These include the export capacity of pipelines from both Supsa, 100,000 
bpd, and Novorossiysk 1,340,000 bpd, and the limited capacity of the 800,000 
bpd Odessa-Brody pipeline. Whilst the Ukrainian refineries are operating at
21 Cited in Manabu Shimizu, (ed.), “The Caspian Power Basin and Its Impact on Eurasian Power 
Games” IDE Spot Survey (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1998). p. 45.
“Russian Pipeline Plans Prevent Pilfering” at
www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/0003172341 .htm [23/06/2000].
23 “LUKoil expands Cooperation with the Ukraine” Press Release (14 October 1999) via LUKoil 
E-mail list.
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under 40 percent of capacity24, there is no under-utilisation in Central Europe 
where refinery capacity is less than one million bpd" . There is another important 
factor, how will Ukraine pay for the product if it is to be used to fuel its economy 
? A further proposal to build another pipeline from Brody to Adamowa Zastawa 
in Poland, a distance of some 300 kilometres, could result in Caspian oil reaching 
Poland and Germany . The supply of Caspian oil to these markets depends 
upon a decrease in supply from Russia, which in the current geopolitical context 
is highly unlikely.
Discussion of these transit corridors is incomplete without reference to the 
Turkish Straits. These narrow passages, in particular the Bosphorus, are 
geostrategic lynch-pins to the successful exploitation of Caspian energy reserves.
The Bosphorus
The Bosphorus choke-point is a significant geographical hurdle to the 
exploitation of Caspian reserves regardless of whether or not the Baku-Ceyhan 
route fails to come on-line. It is currently the only exit point for product from 
Novorossiysk and Supsa, unless the Burgas-Alcxandropolis pipeline, or the 
Burgas-Vlore (Albania) pipeline moves from being mere discussion to actual 
creation. The Burgas-Alexandropolis option is unlikely to eventuate, given the 
environmental danger that a pipeline, along with heavy tanker traffic, would pose 
to the Alexandropolis delta" . Currently an estimated 1.7 million barrels per day 
travel the 31 kilometre long passage that separates continental Europe and Asia, 
with only 0.2 million heading east (north) to markets in the Black Sea such as 
Romania and Bulgaria . The Bosphorus is over-crowded, dangerous and clearly 
not suitable as a long-term exit for Caspian crude either from Supsa or 
Novorossiysk. It has become a ‘traffic jammed obstacle course’ according to one
24 Klid., loc. cit.
25 “Central Europe’s Needs and New Caspian Suppliers”, CIS Special Reports at 
www.stratfor.com/CIS/specialreports/special23.htm [23/06/2000].
26 Klid., loc. cit.
27 Rosemarie Forsythe,. The Politics o f Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). pp.48-49.
28 ibid.
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writer29. The Bosphorus handles three times as many ships as the Suez canal. 
Statistics available from the Turkish Maritime Pilots Association reveal that, in 
1999, 5,540 oil tankers passed through the Bosphorus out of a total 47,906 
vessels. Over 2,168 vessels that traversed the straits were in excess of 200 
metres in length, an average of six passages a day30. To place this into 
perspective compare the relative sizes of tankers in the following chart. A 
medium sized tanker is about 20,000 dwt (deadweight tonnes) and 200 metres in 
length, however vessels in excess of 300 metres regularly make this short but 
extremely hazardous journey.
Table 4.1 Approximate Dimensions of Tankers?/
Dwt Breadth (m) Draught (m) Length (m)
20,000 22 9 180
100,000 41 15 270
200,000 50 18 330
400,000 60 25 370
550,000 63 29 410
In recent years there have been a number of tragic shipping accidents, and not a 
few near-misses, that highlight safety concerns. In 1979, the collision at the 
southern entrance to the Bosphorus, between the Greek tanker Evriyali and the
29 Molly Moore, “The Bosphorus: A Clogged Artery” Washington Post (16 November 2000) at 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28625-2000Nov 15.html [10/12/2000].
30 Statistics o f Passages Through Istanbul Straits Within 1999 at 
www.turkishpilots.org/DOCUMENTS/statistics/bosporusstat99.html [10/12/2000].
31 Alistair Cooper (ed.). The TIMES Atlas o f the Oceans (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1983). p. 
138.
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Romanian owned Independenta resulted in the loss of 43 lives (mainly from the 
Independenta) and the release of 95,000 tons of oil which burned for weeks . 
On 14 March 1994 another tragic accident occurred when the 66,000 ton Greek 
Cypriot registered Nassia collided at the northern entrance to the Bosphorus with
3 3
the Cypriot registered Shipbroker, killing 29 seamen from the Nassia . This 
fatal accident released 20,000 burning tons of oil in to the Bosphorus that raged 
for five days. More recently on 29 December 1999, the Russian tanker Volganeft 
248, en-route from Novorossiysk, ran around south of Istanbul, spilling 800 tons 
of a 4,300 ton cargo of fuel oil into the Marmara Sea34. On 27 July 2000 the 
sister ship to the ill-fated Independenta, Iris Star, formerly the Biruinta, almost 
came to grief in the Bosphorus Straits as well, when its engines cut-out. The 
fully laden tanker with 135,000 tons of crude oil drifted without power for 
several minutes, underneath the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge, and was only aided 
by tug boats as it approached the turn at Kandilli35.
Navigation of the Bosphorus is problematical for a number of reasons which is, 
exacerbated the larger a vessel is. At 31 kilometres in length it has an average 
width of just 1.5 kilometres, with the narrowest only being 700 metres at 
Kandilli. The passage has a total of 12 abrupt angular turns, including several 
blind comers, including Kandilli (mid-way), that has a blind 45 degree bend. At 
Yeniköy, north of Kandilli, the necessary course alteration is 80 degrees36. To 
compound this, there are strong currents and counter-currents of 5-8 knots that 
frequently change, with added seasonable obstacles such as thick fog and snow. 
Upon navigation of the Bosphorus a vessel must also pass through the 70 
kilometre long Straits of Qanakkale (Dardanelles) that has a general width of 1.3
32 This accident although largely unknown was the world’s tenth worst tanker accident so far. 
The worst occurred the same year in the West Indies when 287,000 tonnes was lost as the 
Atlantic Empress broke up. The Exxon Valdez by comparison is ranked 34th, with 37,000 tonnes 
of crude lost. Statistics at www.itopf.com/stats.html [12/12/2000].
33 “Can Novorossiysk Handle the Caspian Oil Boom ?” ibid.
34 Bülent Aliriza, “The Clear and Present Danger in the Turkish Straits”, CSIS Energy Update at 
www.csis.org/turkey/CEU000115.html [18/08/2000].
“Disaster “near-missed” in the Strait of Istanbul” at 
www.turkishpilots.org/NEWS/20000727_Iris_Star_Near_Miss.htm [10/12/2000].
36 “Navigational and Environmental Safety in the Turkish Straits” Republic o f Turkey Embassy 
Website at www.ozemail.com.au/~tuksembs/straitl.htm [18/08/2000].
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- 2 kilometres . With constraints such as this it is no wonder that accidents 
occur.
The passage of oil from Novorossiysk through the Bosphorus is unequivocally a 
cause of anxiety for the Turkish Government as well as others involved in 
seeking to export Caspian oil. Norwegian Oil and Energy Minister, Olav 
Akselsen, whose state owned oil company, Statoil, is part of the AIOC and who 
would benefit from the Ceyhan option, has said that he understands the ‘concerns 
of the Turkish government over the number of vessels using the strait’ and that 
the ‘Bosphorus is not a suitable for transportation of the mail flow of Caspian
*> o
Basin oil’ . Given that Istanbul is home to in-excess of 10 million people, it is 
evident why Turkey has been a strong supporter of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, 
although there are other reasons, both financial and geostrategic, to consider as 
well.
The Gulf conflict between Iraq and the Western backed coalition in support of 
Kuwait resulted in sanctions being placed upon Iraq. One of the results of this 
was the ban on Iraq exporting oil. This had an immediate impact on Turkey, as a 
considerable amount of money was lost from transit fees gained from Iraqi oil 
that flowed to the Ceyhan terminal. Since 1990, Turkey has lost billions in hard 
currency in transit fee revenue. A new pipeline, from a new market, would 
provide in the long term a significant boost to the Turkish treasury, even more 
when sanctions are lifted against Iraq.
The main geopolitical concern for Turkey, is that the Bosphorus is deemed to be 
‘international waters’ because of the 1936 Montreaux Convention, and therefore 
technically outside its control regarding the number, size and cargo of ships that 
transit the straits. The Montreaux Convention was originally a product of the 
defunct League of Nations, through the 1923 treaty of Lausanne, which 
demilitarised the straits leaving Turkey, and Russia, vulnerable to stronger naval
•> 7
37 ibid.
38 “Norway: Bosphorus not suitable as oil route” Lloyd’s List Newspaper, cited at 
www.turkishpilots.org/NEWS/2000_l l_09_Lloyds_List_Bosphorus_Not_Suitable_as_oil_Route 
.htm [11/12/2000].
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powers. According to Daly, the Montreaux Convention was ‘to replace this 
[demilitarised] ad hoc arrangement with something more permanent’39. The 
Montreaux convention is now viewed as customary international law, even if its 
principles are in conflict with the spirit of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982. 
In particular, Article 2 of the Montreux Convention states that ‘in times of peace 
vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation by day and night 
under any flag and with any cargo’40. In theory, this means that the Jahre Viking, 
formerly the Seawise Giant, the world’s largest oil tanker, could attempt to 
traverse the Bosphorus, however given that it is 458 metres in length this is 
unlikely.
In order to create some kind of management regime over the free use of the 
Bosphorus, Turkey established, unilaterally, on 1 July 1994, shortly after the 
Nassia accident, a number of procedures that have been accepted, albeit 
grudgingly, by those nations that use this transit corridor. These regulations were 
discussed by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), naturally meeting 
with strenuous objections from Black Sea littoral member-states and countries 
favoured for tanker registration, such as Cyprus, but Turkey was unmoved in its 
resolve to implement this new regime41. The principle regulations of the Traffic 
Separation Scheme (TSS), include the division of the Istanbul Straits, Marmara 
Sea and the C^anakkale Straits into five separate traffic lanes. Vessels over 200 
metres can only navigate in daylight hours, vessels over 150 metres need to give 
advance notice, and the straits will be closed until vessels carrying dangerous 
cargo (including oil) have passed the Istanbul Straits42.
39 John Daly, “Oil, Guns and Empire: Russia, Turkey, Caspian “New Oil” and the Montreaux 
Convention” Caspian Crossroads Magazine Volume 3, Number 2 (Fall, 1997) at 
www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/325.htm [28/12/98],
40 Captain Mark Rosen, “The Black Sea and her approaches: Will there be fair winds and 
following seas ?” Caspian Infrastructure: Roads Rails and Pipelines Conference (11-12 
December 1997) at www.sipa.columbia.edu/RESOURCES/CASPAIN/inf_pl5.html. 
[02/02/2000],
41 Aliriza, op. cit.
42 “Safety of Navigation” Republic o f Turkey Embassy Website at
www.ozemail.com.au/~turkembs/navigate.htm [31/12/1998].
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It remains to be seen what real effect these regulations will have on the capacity 
to export Caspian crude through the Bosphorus. The Turkish Government has 
forecast a significant increase in tanker traffic if the Northern and Central routes 
depend on the Bosphorus as the main exit from the Black Sea, and has referred to 
the Bosphorus as the ‘Achilles heel’ of the Northern route. There is some 
validity in this statement with half of Russia’s current oil exports leaving via the 
Bosphorus. The anticipated increase in oil production from Azerbaijan alone 
will result in a 100 percent increase in tanker traffic, depending upon the size of 
the tankers used. If medium-sized tankers were used - 25,000 ton - the total 
number of passages would rise by almost 3,000 -  greatly increasing the risk of 
accidents. However the risk, and the impact is multiplied significantly, if tankers 
of 100,000 dwt are used. This would average an additional two tankers per day -  
and lead to closure of the Bosphorus for approximately 6-8 hours per passage, if 
Turkish protocols are followed.
Conversely to this negative view, partly based on reality, partly based on 
promotion of the Ceyhan option, is the fact that Turkey would be able to use the 
Bosphorus for what it is -  a geostrategic noose, capable of effectively stopping 
the transportation of oil from the Caspian basin. Ismail Cem, the Turkish 
Foreign Minister alluded to this in 1998:
We warn those who are contemplating such a calculation that they will 
face serious difficulties in transporting not only existing oil shipments 
but also future ones through the Turkish Straits starting in the year 1999.
To this end Turkey will start implementing all possible means afforded 
by international legislation as well as its own legislation. Turkey has 
both a right and the determination to take all necessary measures to 
protect the ecological system as well as the historic and cultural 
environment of the Turkish Straits43.
Turkey, favoured ally of the US, associate member of the European Union, full 
member of NATO, is in the position to strongly encourage use of the Baku-
43 Press Release Turkish Embassy (Washington) at www.turkey.org/releases/102498.htm 
[31/12/1998].
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Ceyhan option as the limitations placed upon the Turkish Straits, in particular the 
Bosphorus, do not exist with the Ceyhan option.
Baku-T’bilisi-Ceyhan
There are two camps with opposing views when it comes to discussing the Baku- 
Ceyhan option as the MEP for Caspian, mainly Baku-produced, oil. On the one 
hand are politicians (primarily Turkish and American), and on the other, hard- 
nosed and very experienced MOCs. One seeks a political outcome, the other 
wants to make money. Robert Ebel from the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) makes the very salient point that “Pipelines are 
supposed to be built for commercial reasons, not political reasons”44. Richard 
Matzke from Chevron has been more direct in saying that the Baku-Ceyhan 
option “probably isn’t the most rational solution at the moment”45. The MEP is 
actually a decision for the AIOC consortium to make, since in all likelihood it is 
they who will be paying for its construction, regardless of the eventual route. 
The preferred route for the US Government is from Baku to T’bilisi and then 
down into Turkey, possibly skirting the edge of the Kurdish populated South- 
East, eventually reaching the Ceyhan Marine Terminal, at Yumurtalik on the 
Mediterranean Sea, which can easily accommodate 300,000dwt tankers 365 days 
a year.
A question on everyone’s minds is whether or not the production from AIOC 
will be enough to justify the estimated $2.3 to 2.8 billion dollars, according to 
American and Turkish interests, needed to construct the 1,300 kilometre pipeline. 
The economic viability is obviously a concern, and “the AIOC has been warning 
with growing frankness, that the commercial case for Baku-Ceyhan does not add 
up”46. The MEP needs to be carrying l,000,000bpd to be feasible, and according
44 Stephen Kinzer, “On Piping Caspian Oil, US insists the Cheaper, Shorter way isn’t better” New 
York Times on the Web (8 November 1998) at www.nytimes.com [17/02/1999].
45 ibid.
46 “Oil out of troubled waters”, The Economist (28 November 1998), p. 58.
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to the AIOC, its production will peak at 800,000bpd47. The possibility of using 
oil from Tengiz is not feasible as too much has been outlaid on new pipelines and 
facilities at Novorossiysk. Another question is where will the product eventually 
be delivered to. If Caspian oil ends up in the Mediterranean, rather than going to 
East Asia, where the strongest demand is, “this is going to be an extremely 
inefficient way of meeting demand”, according to Mehdi Varzi, an oil analyst at
A O
Kleinwort Benson . In addition to these significant questions, the recent merger 
(take-over) between BP and Amoco has shifted the balance in favour of an 
eastern route for AIOC oil. It has been reported that some oil industry analysts 
believe that BP is very keen to get back into Iran, where years ago the ‘other’ 
AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) originated49. BP owned the old AIOC and 
lost it when it was nationalised by Mossadeq in 195150. Since the combined BP- 
Amoco share in the AIOC is over 34 percent, which is by far the single largest 
block, they have a considerable amount of sway. Given that, according to 
Apostolou, Exxon Mobil, LUKoil and Pennzoil are not in favour of the MEP at 
all, it would appear that other long term options need to be considered -  
including an Iranian option, and with another oilman in the US Whitehouse only 
time will tell51.
The Implications
This thesis argues that the identifiable geopolitical and geostrategic implications 
are a direct consequence of attempts to exploit and extract energy reserves from 
the Caspian sea basin. Some have already been manifested and are currently 
affecting littoral states of the Caspian Sea, other ramifications are yet to
47 Andrew Apostolou, “Changing US Administration Provides Opportunity for review of Caspian 
Policy” Eurasianet Business and Economics at
www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eavO 10401 .shtml [09/01/2001 ].
4S Mehdi Varzi cited in Diarmid O’Sullivan, “Pipe dreams come closer to reality” MEED (28 
March 1997). p. 3.
49 Tom Hundley, “Caspian Sea Oil: A prize the US wants to control” Chicago Tribune (25 
November 1999) via Eurasia Geopolitics email list [01/12/1999],
50 Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall o f the Shah (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). p. 
39.
51 Even if A1 Gore was elected there would still be an oilman in the Whitehouse as Gore has 
significant relations with Occidental Petroleum.
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materialise, being dependent upon the eventual outcome of pipeline direction and 
the long-term entanglement of actions that have occurred thus far. The 
implications are;
♦ Being susceptible to external actors influence over pipeline direction and 
access through political/economic or military intimidation. Examples of 
which include Russian economic intimidation of Kazakstan, America’s 
prohibition of investment in Iran inexcess of $20 million dollars, implicit 
threats from Turkey over continued use of the Turkish straits as a conduit for 
transportation of Caspian oil. Kazakstan decision to cede disputed territory 
to the PRC with the view to exporting reserves to PRC.
♦ Being exposed to latent and manifest insurgency in countries, particularly 
non-contiguous, where pipelines traverse, which may or may not be 
instigated by external actors. Examples of which include Chechnya, Georgia, 
Afghanistan, and separatists such as the PKK
♦ impediment to institutional development, in particular democratic processes, 
as autocrats personally involved in energy exploration are unwilling to allow 
‘fair and free’ elections as this may affect their own standing. Examples 
include the processes that both Aliyev and Nazarbayev have used to 
guarantee their continued control of their respective countries.
♦ Economic mismanagement leading to ‘Dutch Disease’ and instability in the 
region. The primary example being Kazakstan.
Being susceptible to external actors influence over pipeline 
direction and access through political/economic or military 
intimidation
The most consequential implication has been the fact that actors have sought to 
influence or dictate where pipelines will go, either through economic, political or 
military force and intimidation. This was of course going to happen because the 
NIS of the Caspian could only export through the territory of other actors and 
therefore were dependent upon the political good will of these actors. It is
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obvious that actors, in particular Russia, have exercised an undue amount of 
influence upon the CAR and the Caucasus over the last ten years since the 
fragmentation of the USSR. Russian influence over its blizhnee zanibezhie (near 
abroad) was of course, in hindsight, to be expected, but the pervasiveness and 
tenacity of the Russian Federation is quite astounding.
Russia, to enhance its role in the Caucasus used the Russian military to obtain 
concessions from Georgia and Azerbaijan. Originally both had resisted joining 
the CIS, but ‘political causes, played a role in driving both into the 
Commonwealth’52. Russia used Georgia’s irredentist Abkhazian minority and 
Georgia’s own internal weakness to obtain basing rights for its military53. The 
Russian parliament was a strong supporter of the Abkhazians and at the time 
there was speculation as to what forces in Russia were interested in such a turn of 
events54. In neighbouring Armenia the military obtained concessions in 
Armenia's conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. In the Caucasus, 
only Azerbaijan continues to be free from Russian military bases that could be 
used to apply military pressure for the possible benefits of obtaining a further 
slice of the oil reserves of the Caspian Sea basin55. This did not stop Russia 
using ‘gunboat diplomacy’ on the recalcitrant, and anti-Russian, Azeri 
government of Abulfaz Elchibey.
In June 1993, the 104 and 107 Russian infantry divisions rolled toward Baku, 
when Azerbaijan was about to sign a 30 year contract with a US based 
consortium, even though at this stage Azerbaijan was not a member of the CIS 6̂. 
Several days later the Elchibey government fell and the contract naturally was
32 Irina D. Zviagelskaya, “Central Asia and Transcaucasia: New Geopolitics” in Vitaly V. 
Naumkin (ed.). Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict. (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1994). p. 129.
53 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic 
Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). p. 142.
34 Zviagelskaya, loc. cit.
55 Mike Edwards. “The Fractured Caucasus”, National Geographic. Volume 189, Number 2. 
(February 1996). pp. 128-130.
56 Mehdi Mozaffari, “The Oil and Gas of the Caspian Sea: Regional Cooperation and 
Competition”, in Mehdi Mozaffari (ed.). Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). p. 199.
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cancelled. Aliyev, then prime minister, assumed control and quickly 
consolidated his position, reintegrating Azerbaijan into the CIS on 24 September. 
Just days before this announcement, on 17 September, he had meet with Vagit 
Alekperov (an Azeri), President of LUKoil and signed an agreement on the 
principles of cooperation with SOCAR57. On 26 November the new government 
of Aliyev signed an agreement that gave the Russian state oil company [LUKoil] 
a minimum ten percent share in its impending ‘deal of the century’ .
Influence can also be manifested in the amount of power that MOCs have in their 
relationships with Governments. The new oil and gas adviser to Eduard 
Shevardnadze, was a former Vice-President of Chevron. Similar relationships 
exist in Azerbaijan where Aliyev’s son is Vice-President of SOCAR, and in 
Kazakstan where Nazarbayev’s son-in-law is Chief Executive Offcier (CEO) of 
Kazakoil.
The attempts from the US have been less spectacular, primarily because the 
region was for a number years not on its agenda, and when the Clinton 
Administration finally realised the geopolitical significance, in 1997, it was 
almost too late to influence the direction of the MEP. America’s influence has 
been limited to this, and its continuing sanctions against Iraq and Iran, which 
have benefited the proposed route of the MEP through America’s ally Turkey.
Being exposed to latent and manifest insurgency in countries
In addition to being susceptible to pressure from external actors, the examples of 
insurgency and irrendentist movements within these states clearly shows that 
conflict in one state, even if non-contiguous, will have a detrimental effect on the 
viability of that region being a safe conduit for Caspian energy reserves. The 
two wars in Chechnya have provided a unmistakable example of how vulnerable 
an exporting state is to non-contiguous conflict. According to Andrei 
Shoumikhin:
7 Pavel Baev, Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1997). p.32.
58 ibid.
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The war in Chechnya had seriously compromised the very idea of 
exclusive reliance of littoral oil producing states on Russian 
processing and transportation capabilities and has precipitated the 
search for alternatives59.
This kind of conflict has affected both Azerbaijan and Kazakstan. Until the 
Baku-Supsa pipeline was completed Azerbaijan was severely limited in export 
options. Shipments north through Grozny were unreliable as was the Batumi 
railroad. In April 1999 the Chechens shut down the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline 
claiming that $4 million in security fees from Moscow were unpaid60. The Baku- 
Batumi railroad terminates at the principal city of Ajaria, a region effective 
outside the control of the Georgian central government ‘run as a personal 
fiefdom by Aslan Abashidze’61. Ajaria was the only autonomous territory in the 
FSU awarded on the basis of religion, not ethnicity, with 90 percent being 
Georgian Muslim62. However even the Baku-Supsa option is exposed to the 
possibility of latent conflict. Instability in Georgia, directly attributed to Russian 
influence, and its open support for both the Abkhazian and Ajaria irredentist 
forces, could erupt again. This time will antagonists seek to capture or disable 
strategic assets, such as a pipeline ? If this were to happen, who could 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia turn to if they were unable to control the situation ? 
Clearly not Russia.
A scenario like this is bleak, but not confined to the realm of make-believe. 
Although rejected as a possibility by Ilham Aliev, President Heidars’s son and 
Vice-President of SOCAR and now Speaker of the Parliament, the notion that 
NATO would be involved in protecting pipeline routes cannot be totally cast
59 Andrei Shoumikhin, “New Developments Related to Caspian Oil” Perspectives on Central 
Asia Volume 1, Number 9 (December 1996) at www.cpss.org/casianw/decpers.html 
[31/08/1998],
60 Richard R. Dion, “Long view of Caspian oil export options tilts to Kazakstan-China” Oil and 
Gas Journal (7 June 1999) at www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m3112/23_97/54906401/print.jhtml 
[18/09/2000],
61 Roberts, op. cit.. p. 19.
62 Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride o f Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder 
(London: Zed Books, 1994). p. 38.
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out63. Were NATO to become involved in a possible conflict, if it was providing 
a military force to safeguard the pipeline, then it is highly probable that the 
conflict would quickly escalate into a far more serious battle with global 
ramifications. After, all as Baev suggests, ‘Russia has relied strongly -  as it has 
always done- on military instruments in pursuing its political goals in the 
Caucasus’64.
In a similar vein, should the MEP actually proceed, what assurances will Turkey 
provide against attack from the Partly a Kärkeräna Kurdistan (Kurdish Worker’s 
Party -  PKK), given that in 1997 they attacked the Iraqi pipeline to Ceyhan ?65 
Instability is not limited to the Caucasus. The conflict in Afghanistan, as well as 
the policies of the ruling Taliban have all but killed off any notion of a pipeline 
from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and onward to energy-starved India. Pipeline 
history in the Middle East suggests that;
Few pipelines have survived and prospered in politically volatile 
areas. Successful pipelines -  Trans-Mediterranean (Algeria-Tunis- 
Italy) and Maghreb-Europe (Algeria-Morocco-Spain) seem to be 
based on a depoliticised environment, private law models and limited 
state involvement66.
The environment of constructing pipelines is highly politicised in the 
Caspian, with significant state involvement. A positive feature of state 
involvement is that the AIOC process is part of the Azeri legal code. 
Whether this would prove beneficial remains to be seen.
63 “Azerbaijan Oil Official Rules Out NATO Guard for Pipeline” Transcaucasia and Central Asia 
RFE/RL Newsline at www.rferl.org/newsline/22-tca.html [02/12/1999]. See also Richard 
Sokolsky and Tanya Charlick-Paley, NATO and Caspian Security A Mission Too Far ? 
(Washington: RAND, 1999).
64 Baev, op. cit.. p. 57.
65 Olivier Roy, “Crude Manoeuvres” Index OnLine (Issue 4/97) at
www.oneworld.org/index_oc/issue497/roy.html [11/08/2000].
Thomas Waelde, Sergei Vinogradov and Armando Zamora, “The Caspian Dilemma: Prosperity 
or Conflict?” Caspian Oil and Gas at www.poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/Vol5/waelde.htm 
[01/08/2000],
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Impediment to institutional development, in particular democratic 
processes
The CAR and the Caucasus emerged from the Soviet political system so it should 
have been expected that civil society institutional frameworks would take a 
period of time to gain acceptance, if at all. Liberal Democratic ideals, and the 
electoral governance processes intrinsic to being able to conduct free and fair 
elections appeared to gain a strong foothold in a number of republics such as 
Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia and Georgia. Georgia, a complex 
federation along ethnic lines began to implode, with the help of Russia, and 
along with Azerbaijan went down the path of other nations in seeing its 
democratically elected president ousted in a coup d'etat, also helped along by 
Russian interference . Authoritarianism continued in Uzbekistan, increased 
even more so in Turkmenistan to the point of totalitarianism, and the state 
essentially failed in Tajikistan68. The close, and seemingly successful, 
relationship that MOCs have with governments like these should not come as a 
surprise.
Oil companies take a more relaxed attitude to political risk than 
many other firms. They are used to dealing with violent or unstable 
countries. Because oil is simply pumped out of the ground and can 
be speedily exported, they can tolerate economic mismanagement, 
civil disobedience and even isolated violence in the host country 
more easily than other industries69.
The interference has been at the visceral level as a result of the importance of 
hydrocarbon development to these countries increases. Normal democratic 
development would see the creation of electoral bodies either non-partisan or 
multi-partisan in character, but independent from the governments agenda.
67 For a discussion on the conflicts within Georgia and Azerbaijan at this time see Suzanne 
Goldenberg, op. cit.
6S For a discussion on the return to authoritarianism in the CAR see Bess A. Brown, 
“Authoritarianism in the New States of Central Asia: An Overview of Post-Independence 
Politics” Bericht des BlOst, (Nr 46/1996).
69 “A Caspian Gamble A Survey of Central Asia” The Economist (7 February 1998). p. 6.
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Ideally the Central Election Commission would have the backing of an 
independent legislature to oversee free and fair elections. This development has 
not been forthcoming. In 1999, Nazarbayev won another seven year term as 
President, which was not totally unexpected. However in order to ensure this, 
the Supreme Court of Kazakstan disqualified former prime minister Akezhan 
Kazhegeldin as a candidate . As Fink attests “having a constitutional law that 
allows for presidential appointments guarantees a favourable administrative 
system’’71. Voting irregularities, including the stuffing of ballot boxes, were 
reported at the Parliamentary Elections later that year as well, by various 
election observers, including the German Ambassador to Kazakstan, Dr. 
Michael Libel72. The US policy, as espoused by Strobe Talbott in 1997, toward 
Central Asia and the Caucasus noted America’s support in the region in four 
distinct sphere’s of influence, including the promotion of democracy . 
However as Adam Smith Albion has correctly stated “the United States is happy 
to deal with plenty of autocratic led states that have hydrocarbons, and surely 
this has not gone unnoticed by the Central Asia leaders”74.
It was recently revealed in July of 2000, that the US Justice department was 
investigating an adviser to Nazarbayev over laundering money. The Justice 
department said that $60 million, thought to be payments from western oil 
companies for Kazak oil, are in accounts, allegedly controlled by Nazarbayev, 
former Prime Minister Kazhegeldin, and Balgimbayev, another former Prime
70 Steve LeVine, “Caspian Logic: Democracy ? Sure, Sure. Now Buy our Oil.” New York Times 
on the Web (3 January 1999) at www.nytimes.com [17/02/1999].
71 Michael Fink, “Disempowerment Through Democratization: Recent Elections in Kazakhstan
and Tajikistan” Central Asia Caucasus Analyst (November 24 1999) at
www.cacianalyst.org/Nov%2024/Fink.htm [06/01/2000].
72 “The 1999 Parliamentary Elections in Kazakstan -  Towards Democracy ?” Central Asia
Caucasus Analyst (3 November 1999) at
www.caciananylst.org/fomm%20Summaries/Nov%203%20kazak%20elect.htm [06/01/2000].
77 Strobe Talbott, “A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia” 
Central Asia Caucasus Analyst at
www.caicanalyst.org/fomm%20Summaries/july%2021%20Talbott.htm [06/01/2000],
74 LeVine, ibid.
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Minister and now head of Kazakoil75. This matter is still unresolved, but 
presents a grime picture if the charges are proved.
Economic mismanagement leading to ‘Dutch Disease’ and 
instability in the region
The social and economic problems facing the hydrocarbon exporting states of the 
Caspian Basin are not unique to these states, nor the (unrealised) hopes attached 
to the expected revenue windfall. Willy Olsen, a senior adviser to Statoil 
commenting on the role of the energy sector in the region said that “The euphoria 
of independence and the hopes of a free and prosperous future has to a large 
extent been replaced by disillusionment. The counties of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus have yet to return to 1989 GDP levels” . Kazakstan is a state on the 
path to developing Dutch Disease and has already developed a ‘rentier state’ 
attitude to it energy reserves. The government of Kazakstan has encouraged 
popular expectation of;
imminent wealth and has engaged in both overspending and excessive 
borrowing, whilst ignoring the plight of key economic sectors, such as 
manufacturing and agriculture, and failing to develop a reliable tax 
collection system .
Kazakstan is falling into the same trap that the USSR did when it came to 
developing the cotton monoculture, short-term gains without long term planning. 
Because there is an inadequate taxation system Kazakstan has been forced to sell 
half of its share in the Tengiz field in a private invitation based auction, due to a 
$560 million budget shortfall . Kazakstan received an estimated $1.2 billion in
78 Louise Shelley, “Corrupt Oil Practices Implicate President Nazarbayev” Central Asia 
Caucasus Analyst (19 July 2000) at www.cacianalyst.org/Headlinel.htm [26/07/2000].
7<> Ben Partridge, “Caspian Sea: Oil-Rich Caspian Nations Should Emulate Norway’s Model” 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (9 July 1999) at
www.rfefl.org/nca/features/ 1999/07/F.R.U.990709135224.html [23/07/1999],
77 Pauline Jones Luong, “Kazakhstan: The Long Term Costs of Short-term Gains” in “Energy 
Wealth and Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus” NBR Analysis, Volume 10, Number 
3, (August 1999). p. 30.
78 Steve LeVine, “Short on Funds, Kazakhstan to Sell off the Vast Tengiz Oilfield” New York 
Times on the Web (19 August 1999), www.nytimes.com/99/08/19/financial [20/08/1999],
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direct investment when then Prime Minister Kazhegeldin sold off the bulk of the 
governments shares in various hydrocarbon based enterprises, including its three 
oil refineries79. Eventually Kazakstan will have no hard assets left to sell, and 
then must either rely on the rents collected from the oil fields, and/or seek to 
reform the system -  at greater pain to the populace. In addition to the 
privatisation approach that the government has followed, it has shifted the 
responsibility, and the blame, to the owners of ventures once controlled by the 
state. The effect on the populace will result in growing discontent with the 
‘market reforms’ and will call for a return to the ‘good old days’ with a state- 
controlled economy. Thereby compounding the challenged democratic process 
even further.
Who then is the Winner ?
If the prize is the transport corridors who then is the winner ? In chapter one it 
was stated that:
The winners will be those actors who control access to the potential 
pipeline routes, those that are able to charge transit fees, and those 
actors whose product is ultimately exported.
In order to answer this perhaps it is easier identify who are not the winners. The 
FSU exporting littoral states of Azerbaijan and Kazakstan, or Turkmenistan, that 
has yet to really enter the race are not winners, due to two factors, firstly they 
have no real control over access and their countries are suffering from the 
negatives results of the geopolitical and geostrategic implications identified. 
Neither is Iran a winner, at this stage, as it is most likely that with the change in 
Administration in the US with George W. Bush as President, the Iran-Libya 
Sanction Act (ILSA) will remain a viable component of US Foreign policy in the 
region for the conceivable future. Although there have been a number of ‘special
79 Luong, op. cit.. p. 43.
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dispensations’ granted in recent years, in particular the 1998 decision to allow 
French/Russian/Malaysian investment in the South Pars gas field80.
Amongst the Caspian states, only the Russian Federation has achieved any short­
term geopolitical or economic advantage from pipeline direction. However the 
Transneft system is, as Olivier Roy mentions, ‘ramshackle[d] and unequal to the 
challenge of pumping the flood of energy expected to flow from Asia’s
01
hinterland in the first decade of the twenty-first century’ . So while it might be 
correct in the interim to say that Russia has won the initial prize, the reality is 
quite different. Unless Russia seeks to invest significant capital into 
refurbishment of the existing pipeline structure, the anticipated flow from regions 
such as Tengiz will be go to new pipelines, and most likely not through the 
Russian Federation. However, even with a significant increase in pipeline 
capacity, the continued use of the Bosphorus as an export route is as previously 
mentioned, open to possible unilateral actions from Turkey.
The purpose of this paper was not to focus on a winner, but rather to identify 
geopolitical and geostrategic implications. One of the outcomes from identifying 
such implications is of course that there are losers, and in this particular race, it 
has been the common people of those littoral FSU communities that have no way 
of changing the immediate future, because they have no effective voice in which 
to communicate their concerns, except through violence. The rise in suspicious 
electoral governance processes has seen any effective opposition effectively 
blocked from running for office. However even the leaders of these communities 
are not winners either. A failure to produce the results they often speak of can 
only lead to mounting dissent, this coupled with the increase in social and 
economic maladies is fuel for either radical political reform, or a continued 
regression into authoritarianism. One only has to look at the fall of the Shah of 
Iran to see that a community divided from the wealth of oil, and without an 
effective voice can only remain silent for so long. As Brzezinski has bluntly
80 “US waives sanctions on South Pars field” Oil and Gas Journal (25 May 1998) at 
www.fmdarticles.com/cf_0/m3112/n21_v96/20787069/print.jhtml [18/09/2000].
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said, 'Russia can either be an empire or a democracy, but it cannot be both' and 
the same can be said for Kazakstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan .
This thesis has suggested that the plight of the sturgeon is a barometer of 
multilateral consensus and cooperation in the region. On 11 February 2001 a 
meeting between international caviar barons and scientists admitted they were 
‘fighting a losing battle against the grinding poverty’ that forces people to poach
o -)
immature sturgeon . That grinding poverty is a result of the economic 
mismanagement, itself an outcome of the race to exploit Caspian hydrocarbons. 
Legislation aside, such as declaring a moratorium on fishing and imposing hefty 
fines for poaching, the continued survival, or the demise, of the Caspian sturgeon 
is the best indicator of the level of trust among the littoral states of the Caspian 
Sea and the amount of geopolitical and geostrategic manoeuvring between them. 
To date the signs are not promising.
81 Zbigniew Brzezinski. “The Premature Partnership” Foreign Affairs (March-April, 1994). p. 
72.
83 “Caviar barons meet greens in Moscow to save sturgeon” Reuters (11/02/2001) via Caspian 
Clips (International Institute for Caspian Studies: Tehran) E-Mail list [13/02/2001].
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